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INTRODUCTION 
Paradoxical interventions are therapeutic change strategies which appear to 
run counter to conventionally defined principles of human change. The practice of 
therapeutic paradox has been recorded as early as 1786 (O'Connell, 1983). The 
case literature is replete with descriptions of rapid and dramatic behavioral change 
(DiTomasso & Greenberg, 1989), as well as an higher number of empirical studies 
to test the effectiveness of such techniques. The first section of the literature review 
briefly describes paradoxical interventions, outlines appropriate conditions for their 
use, as well as notes how they are imbedded in various theoretical systems of 
psychotherapy. In addition, a description of proposed mechanisms of change is 
provided, including the role of client reactance potential (a primary predictor 
variable in this study). 
Although the reported outcomes of these interventions appear very attractive 
to therapists searching for additional treatment methods (particularly for work with 
treatment refractory cases), clinical data are needed to provide a stronger 
foundation for using techniques which appear to be counterintuitive. Outcome 
research has begun to provide evidence of the general efficacy of paradoxical 
Interventions (Hill, 1987; Shoham-Salomon & Rosenthal, 1987; DeBord, 1989; 
Martinez-Taboas, 1990). A synthesis and analysis of this literature will be provided. 
As literature on clinical efficacy continues to develop, so does the discussion 
regarding the ethics of using paradoxical strategies in therapy. The effects of using 
these techniques has at times been so startling that some have labeled adept 
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practitioners of paradox "therapeutic magicians" (Weeks, 1991). Such a reaction 
has drawn an appropriately skeptical eye, and the literature review outlines the 
ethical issues surrounding the use of paradox, including the role of the therapeutic 
rationale (another primary predictor variable in this study). 
When ethical concerns surround a treatment approach that is counterintuitive 
by definition, clinicians considering the use of these techniques may experience 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Cooper and Fazio, 1984). Of relevance to 
such a concept is the question: "Do some clinicians perceive the paradox to 
contradict their fundamental belief systems about therapy to such an extent that 
they experience psychological discomfort when considering the use of such 
interventions?" In the present study it was proposed that the experience and 
reduction of dissonance arousal may be important factors which are predictive of 
clinician treatment acceptability ratings of paradoxical interventions. 
Purpose of Study 
The central purpose of this study was to determine what role dissonance 
plays in the decision making process associated with the consideration of using 
paradoxical techniques. More specifically, the role of dissonance was studied in 
relation to effects of client reactance and the presence or absence of a rationale. 
These two variables (reactance and rationale) were hypothesized to influence the 
level of clinicians' acceptability ratings, and may be associated with clinicians' levels 
of cognitive dissonance. Contingent upon the degree of dissonance arousal 
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experienced, various clinician treatment decisions and dissonance-reducing 
motivational behaviors were predicted and stated as directional hypotheses. The 
study had three basic purposes, which range from descriptive to predictive in their 
intended contribution to the literature. 
First, this study proposed to provide a quantitative assessment of 
psychologists' familiarity, use, and attitudes regarding the use of paradoxical 
interventions. The best available standards of practice are conceptual articles and 
books which offer the clinical positions of the respective authors. While these 
provide some guidelines to therapists, their impact on what psychologists are 
actually doing is uncertain at this time. A descriptive assessment of a sample of 
psychologists should add to defining a standard of practice for the field. 
Second, this study proposed to assist in gaining an understanding of the 
reasons for clinicians' decisions whether to use paradoxical interventions. To the 
extent that there are objections within the profession, are they made on theoretical 
grounds, are they related to lack of information and training regarding paradoxical 
interventions, or perhaps both? This study provided a fully crossed model of two 
variables considered to be important in the determination of appropriateness of a 
paradoxical intervention (rationale and reactance), and included the influence of 
demographic variables and overall clinician experience with using paradoxical 
interventions. 
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Third, this study included cognitive dissonance in a proposed model for 
intervention decision making regarding paradoxical interventions. This study 
proposed that dissonance may play a role in decisions about the treatment 
acceptability of these interventions. Psychologists' levels of dissonance arousal 
were measured following exposure to a vignette in which they will assume the role 
of a clinician administering a paradoxical intervention. The reactance potential of 
the client in the vignette and the presence or absence of a treatment rationale were 
manipulated, with predictions made about how various levels of these manipulated 
variables may lead to varying levels of dissonance arousal. In addition, 
psychologists use of dissonance reduction strategies as a means of coping with the 
discomfort of cognitive inconsistency were measured. 
This study offered additional information about the factors relevant to 
psychologists when making decisions about the acceptability of this controversial 
form of treatment. In a broader sense, mediational models involving dissonance 
and other social psychological processes may become instructive in understanding 
ethical decision making behavior. For example, if dissonance is found to be a 
relevant factor in choosing an intervention for a client, can or should such arousal 
be effectively and ethically reduced? This may have immediate implications for 
training and supervision, and farther reaching implications for the field upon the 
introduction of novel ideas. 
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Statistical analyses were conducted to report demographic information about 
the sample, psychometric properties of the survey, and manipulation checks to 
determine the effectiveness of the experimental conditions. Multiple regression 
analyses were conducted to test for differences by condition on each of the 
dependent variables. It was proposed that if a strong pattern of meaningful 
differences were detected, a modeling procedure would be conducted to account for 
such group differences. This was proposed to consist of a series of regression 
analyses that can be compared to one another to determine if client reactance 
potential, the therapeutic rationale, and level of clinician experience explain a 
meaningful amount of the variance in reported levels of treatment acceptability and 
dissonance arousal and reduction. 
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REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Paradoxical Interventions 
The empirical and conceptual literature on the use of paradoxical 
interventions In psychotherapy has developed significantly in the past decade. 
Paradoxical interventions are so named because the therapist assists the client in 
behavioral change through ways that appear to contradict expected therapeutic 
change principles. A classic example involved directing a client who suffered from 
insomnia to scrub and wax the kitchen floor whenever his attempts to sleep failed. 
The client was given an ordeal (scrubbing the floor) in which the symptom of 
insomnia (staying awake) must be maintained. Haley (1984) reports that in this 
particular case, the client's insomnia went Into remission after several weeks of 
treatment. 
History 
Encouraging or intensifying presenting symptoms, or even attempting to 
prevent or restrain client attempts to reduce their symptoms, appears at first to be a 
counterproductive strategy for promoting enhanced psychological functioning. The 
conceptual basis for paradoxical techniques is based upon theoretical and practical 
considerations. Several authors have provided summaries of the historical 
development and classification of paradoxical interventions (Weeks & L'Abate, 
1982; Dowd & Milne. 1986; Ascher, 1989). 
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One of the earliest accounts of paradoxical therapy was described by 
O'Conneli (1983), who reported an English physician's use of such a strategy for 
therapeutic purposes as early as 1786. More recently, the first half of this century is 
sparingly marked with reports of the use of paradoxical interventions by influential 
practicing theorists (Adier, 1923; Dunlap, 1928; FrankI, 1939). As today, these 
therapists were able to integrate paradoxical interventions into comprehensive 
theories of human behavior change. This counterintuitive treatment approach has 
been more closely examined in conceptual writings and case literature since the 
1960s (Riebel, 1984), and has been subject to empirical scrutiny for little more than 
a decade (Dowd & Swoboda, 1984; Strong, 1984; Kraft, Claibom, & Dowd, 1985). 
Contemporary research is briefly reviewed in later sections on treatment 
effectiveness and acceptability. 
Types of Paradoxical Interventions 
Paradoxical interventions have been developed within a wide variety of 
theoretical systems. Some of the interventions that may appear to be more 
conventional can be conceptualized as paradoxical. These include; massed 
practice, stimulus satiation, implosion and flooding in behavior therapy (Hull, 1943; 
Allyon, 1963; Weeks & L'Abate, 1982; Marks, 1970); reframing in cognitive therapy 
(Mahoney, 1986); paradoxical intention in logotherapy (FrankI, 1939,1991); and 
ordeal therapy (Haley, 1973, 1984; Erickson, 1959,1964, 1965, 1973, 1977; 
Madanes, 1981; Papp, 1980; Watzlawick, Weakland & Fisch, 1974). 
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With a more recent effort at developing an integrative model of therapy which 
is uniquely paradoxical, these interventions have been categorized by similarity of 
format or by therapeutic intent. Symptom prescription, the prototypical Intervention, 
requires the client to engage in or exaggerate the problematic symptom or behavior. 
This usually takes the form of homework assignments, but in-session use may also 
be effective. The therapist might encourage specifying the time of initiation and the 
duration of engaging in symptom prescription. 
Less active and more cognitive than prescribing or scheduling, reframing the 
symptom can shift the client's frame of reference about the presenting concern and 
lead to effective behavior change. Research suggests that reframing interventions 
that involve a positive connotation tend to be more effective than interventions 
without a positive connotation (Akillas & Efran, 1995). A positive connotation refers 
to the process of giving the client feedback about the presenting problems or 
symptoms in a favorable context. For example, a withdrawn and depressed client 
could be told about the healthy, protective and restorative qualities of retreating in 
order to take good care of himself. Similarly, relabeling explicitly uses language to 
assign new names to problem behaviors and symptoms. The intended effect is to 
shift the frame of reference in a plausible way that normalizes the client experience 
and enhances perceived efficacy in managing the presenting problem. 
Another form of paradoxical interventions is exemplified by the strategy of 
restraining. Rather than encouraging client growth and change, a client who is 
being restrained is quite literally discouraged from making progress. This can take 
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extreme forms in forbidding change, or be more subtle in pointing out negative 
consequences of change. Additional restraining strategies include predicting 
relapses, prescribing relapses, declaring hopelessness, and positioning. 
Theoretical Underpinnings and Mechanisms of Change 
With the presence of paradoxical strategies in a variety of theoretical 
systems are a variety of explanations for how such interventions produce client 
change. Dowd (personal communication, 10/20/95) has stated that the primary 
mechanisms of change for paradoxical interventions are likely: 1) a therapeutic 
double-bind (the logically binding proposition of being "changed if you do and 
changed if you don't"); and 2) a noveltv effect which aids the client in shifting the 
client's frame of reference regarding the problem and it's potential solutions. The 
double-bind and a novelty effect have roots in various systems of psychotherapy. 
This section will further elucidate the theoretical foundations for these concepts. 
Double-Bind Theorv 
The double-bind concept has origins in the communications studies of 
anthropologist Gregory Bateson and his colleagues (Bateson, Jackson, Haley, & 
Weakland, 1956). Bateson et al. (1956) proposed that schizophrenic symptoms 
were the result of communication patterns (pathological double-binds) within the 
family of the schizophrenic patient. Typical of this pattem is a situation whereby a 
parent delivers to the child a directive with punishing consequences and a 
contradictory directive with equally punishing consequences, but at a higher level of 
abstraction (Dowd & Milne, 1986). A frequently used example of this pattern is a 
mother who verbally directs her child to come closer to her while nonverbally 
pushing the child away. In order to produce the pathological effect, Bateson et al. 
(1956) suggested that these pattems must occur repeatedly and in the context of an 
intense emotional relationship. When such a pattern becomes internalized, the 
child perceives interactions with the world as double-binds, resulting in confusion 
and Impaired communication abilities. Bateson et al. suggested that psychotherapy 
could be used to propose therapeutic double binds which could produce more 
effective interaction pattems. 
Many theorists, clinicians, and researchers in family therapy expanded on 
Bateson's work in devising a variety of creative techniques to deliver therapeutic 
double binds. The work of Milton Erickson (1959; 1964; 1965; 1973; 1977), Jay 
Haley (1963; 1984), Paul Watzlawick (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967; 
Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974), Mara Selvini-Palazzoli (Selvinl-Palazzoli, 
Cecchin, Prata, and Boscolo, 1978), and Cloe Madanes (1981) are a few of the 
exemplar figures in family therapy who have made substantial contributions to the 
applications of therapeutic paradox. 
The family therapy field has since tumed attention toward models of therapy 
that advocate for more direct, open, and mutually constructive dialogical processes. 
Examples of these from the past decade include collaborative language systems 
theory (Goolishlan & Anderson, 1987,1992; Anderson & Goolishian, 1988) and 
narrative approaches to therapy (White & Epston, 1990). These approaches signify 
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movements within the field of family therapy away from comparatively more 
manipulative strategies toward philosophical stances such as social constructionism 
(Gergen, 1985; McNamee & Gergen, 1992). For example, Goolishian and 
Anderson have proposed that the primary objective In collaborative language 
systems therapy is to allow the client's story to be an ever-evolving, self-
constructing reality that develops in the context of therapy. Change occurs through 
mutual dialogue which constructs new meaning, not by the therapists efforts to lead 
(whether or not paradoxically) a client to an inherent truth or an assumed objective 
reality. 
Psvcholooical Reactance 
Though the concept of pathogenic double bind in the etiology of 
schizophrenia has debatable explanatory utility, the logic of a therapeutic double 
bind remains central to explaining the mechanism of paradoxical change. More 
recent research has explored the role of psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966; 
Brehm & Brehm, 1981) in the double binding process of a paradoxical intervention 
(Dowd, Hughes, Brockbank, Halpain, Siebel &Siebel, 1988; Shoham-Salomon, 
Avner, & Neeman, 1989). Psychological reactance is a motivational state assumed 
by persons when they perceive their freedom to choose or behave has been 
threatened or eliminated by some external agent. The goal of this motivation is to 
maintain or restore the lost freedom. Dowd, Wallbrown, Sanders and Yesenosky 
(1994) noted that a range of recent studies have suggested that psychological 
reactance may be an Important client variable which mediates therapy process and 
outcome. Beutler and Clarkin's (1990) integrated therapy model of treatment 
selection includes reactance as an important element in the decision making 
process of therapy. 
A client who is high in reactance can be assumed to be relatively more 
resistant to interpersonal influence in therapy than the client who is low in 
reactance. Personality research suggests that highly reactant persons (in 
comparison to persons low in reactance) are likely to be less concerned with making 
a good social impression, less likely to follow social norms and rules, more likely to 
be careless about meeting obligations, less likely to be tolerant of the beliefs and 
values of others, and more likely to express strong feelings and emotions (Dowd, et 
al., 1994). Beutler and Clarkin (1990) suggested that reactance is inherently an 
interpersonal phenomenon, describing reactance as "an individual's likelihood of 
resisting threatened loss of interpersonal control," which includes "the forcefulness 
of one's efforts to resist external influence" (pp. 72-73). 
Empirical studies testing the role of reactance in paradoxical therapy have 
provided tentative support for the importance of this client personality variable. 
Dowd et al. (1988) concluded that reactance has some minor effects on therapy 
outcome, although no main effect was found for reactance in their analyses. 
Shoham-Salomon et al. (1989) reported that clients high in reactance potential 
showed more improvement when administered a paradoxical intervention than did 
clients low in reactance potential, while the latter group did increase their general 
sense of their ability to make changes. The validity of this study is limited, however, 
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due to the nature of the reactance manipulation in the experiment (e.g., tone of 
voice was manipulated to represent high and low levels of reactance). Reactance 
was manipulated by these researchers, thus not measured as a trait of individual 
subjects. Swoboda et al. (1990) reported no effects of reactance in research with 
depressed clients. 
Rohrbaugh, Tennen, Press and White (1981) suggested that two kinds of 
paradoxical interventions (compliance-based and defiance-based interventions) 
could be considered, contingent upon client reactance potential. Defiance-based 
interventions are most appropriate when reactance potential is high. When a highly 
reactant client resists the counselor's paradoxical directive by defying the directive, 
the client has met the goals of therapy. An unwanted behavior (e.g., a panic attack) 
cannot continue if the client defies the instruction to perform that behavior. Thus, 
paradoxical interventions with clients who are high in reactance use the clients' own 
defense strategies as tools to promote therapeutic change. However, paradoxical 
interventions may also provide some benefit to clients who are designated to be low 
in psychological reactance. 
Compliance-based interventions assume that when clients comply with an 
assigned intervention, the change process has already begun. Change occurs 
when the client begins to establish some volition over a behavior previously thought 
to be "out of control." For example, the avoidant behaviors of a client who is 
concerned about socially anxious responses to embarrassing situations can no 
longer be considered automatic if the client is able to produce them according to a 
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predetermined schedule. Such compliance-based strategies appear to be 
associated with Bandura's (1986) self-efficacy theory, as the client strives to 
enhance self-efficacy expectations through behavioral experiments (Shoham-
Salomon, Avner, & Neeman, 1989). Dowd et al. (1994) noted that several recent 
studies provide support for Rohrbaugh et al.'s proposal of classifying paradoxical 
interventions into compliance-and defiance-based strategies. Most notably, Horvath 
and Goheen (1990) reported significant support for the moderating effects of 
reactance in the compliance-and defiance-based model of paradoxical 
interventions. 
The Noveltv Effect 
In addition to the double binding mechanism, a number of authors suggest 
that paradoxical interventions produce client change via a novelty effect which 
assists the client in shifting personal meaning about themselves, their problems, 
and the possibilities for solutions (Dowd, 1995; Mahoney, 1986; Madanes, 1981). 
Such shifts are initiated through reframing, the use of humor, and detachment. The 
emphasis on detachment from symptoms through humor is a notion that has been 
emphasized by FrankI (1939) in his early writings about the use of paradoxical 
intention. 
Paradoxical interventions produce a second-order change, the impact of 
which can be change that affects the symptomatic behaviors as well as the contexts 
in which they are imbedded (Watzlawick et al., 1974). In contrast, first order 
change directives instruct clients to apply the opposite of the target behavior. First-
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order change directives are used with the intent of effecting behavior change at the 
level of the individual and his or her symptoms. Second-order change directives are 
used with the intent of effecting changes in an individual's behavior, but with farther 
reaching implications for change in systems in which symptoms and problematic 
behaviors are imbedded. Second-order changes are presumed to have greater 
durability in the way that systemic changes can continue to support changes in 
previously symptomatic behavior. 
If first order change is effective in treating depression, then a client's 
symptoms might have been reduced by encouraging increased activity, regular 
sleep and diet, and maintenance of positive affect. If first order change directives 
are not effective, then "more of the same" therapeutic strategy is applied (Dowd & 
Pace, 1989). However, first order changes are more likely to be experienced in 
isolation from other aspects of the client's life-most notably, the systems in which 
the client lives. The client experiencing depression may show a reduction in target 
symptoms while the family or work systems may begin to suffer as previous 
interaction patterns are disrupted. Paradoxical interventions can be utilized as 
second order change strategies-as unconventional tools which can lead to new 
levels of Insight, shifts In the client's frame of reference, and change at a more 
systemic level. Conceptually, second order change could be more effective, 
pervasive, and perhaps more generalizable than first order change. 
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While the basic idea of assisting the client in adopting a new frame of 
reference could be a common factor to a variety of therapeutic approaches, this 
mechanism appears to be particularly important to paradoxical interventions. The 
novelty effect has been conceptualized in a variety of ways. Merely assisting a 
client in thinking about the problem in a different way is likely to be broadly agreed-
upon contributor to change in a variety of therapies. Omer (1986) offers an elegant 
discussion of how a client's symptoms are imbedded in a context which the therapist 
must creatively consider when integrating paradoxical interventions in promoting 
client growth. 
Summary of Mechanisms of Change 
In summary, there appears to be general consensus that paradoxical 
interventions contribute to client change by placing the client in a therapeutic 
double bind which provides a novel frame of reference for solution finding. The 
concepts of the double bind and a novel reframe both have evolved through various 
theories of psychotherapy. The notion of positive reframing is important to 
paradoxical interventions in particular (Akillas & Efran, 1995; Dowd and Milne, 
1986), and does not appear to be a source of ethical contention among therapists. 
The concept of a logical double-bind appears to be unique to this therapeutic 
maneuver. Recent psychological literature provides some support for the role that 
reactance potential plays in the process of a therapeutic double bind. Reactance 
potential as a proposed client variable is included in this study because this may be 
a crucial determinant in clinicians' decisions about the appropriateness of 
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paradoxical interventions with a particular client. Do therapists assess (implicitly or 
explicitly) reactance potential in their clients, then decide to utilize such motivational 
states as therapeutic leverage? This study intended to help in determining the 
extent to which licensed psychologists consider reactance potential in making 
judgments about the acceptability of paradoxical interventions. 
Effectiveness of Paradoxical Interventions 
While process research strives to explain the nature of paradoxical 
mechanisms of change, outcome research documents the treatment effectiveness of 
such interventions. Two meta-analytic reviews have been conducted (Shoham-
Saiomon & Rosenthal, 1987; Hill, 1987), as well as a variety of nanrative reviews of 
the empirical literature to date (Ascher, 1989; DeBord, 1989; Dowd & Milne, 1986; 
Weeks, 1991). The conclusions of the quantitative outcome reviews to date will be 
briefly described to establish the utility of paradoxical interventions in the context of 
psychotherapy. The limitations of this literature have been targets of criticism-
adding to the controversy associated with the use of these techniques, and 
potentially diminishing the utility of this research to the practitioner. 
Meta-Analvtic Studies 
Shoham-Salomon and Rosenthal's (1987) meta-analytic review included 
twelve data sets from empirical outcome research using symptom prescription as a 
paradoxical technique. The inclusion criteria for studies required the use of a group 
(rather than case) design, random assignment of subjects to groups, and the 
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context of an individual therapy session for the provision of the clinical 
interventions. These criteria yielded ten studies and a total of twelve data sets. For 
each comparison between two groups, the effect size r was computed. Shoham-
Salomon and Rosenthal's (1987) general results indicated that paradoxical 
interventions were as effective as (but not more effective than) other techniques of 
treatment. Second, this level of effectiveness was found for one-month follow-up 
assessments. 
A third important finding suggested that when only considering the use of 
paradoxical interventions, those Interventions which employ a positive connotation 
of the symptom are more effective than interventions which do not. When a positive 
connotation is used, the therapist suggests that there is some beneficial function for 
the client's symptoms or problematic behaviors. For example, a depressed client 
might be given encouraging feedback about her efforts to care for herself by 
withdrawing from stressful life events. The authors then assessed the efficacy of 
paradoxical interventions within the context of Smith, Glass, & Miller's (1980) classic 
meta-analysis of psychotherapies. Positively connoted paradoxical interventions 
ranked third highest in a rank ordering of effect sizes for seventeen psychotherapies 
(behind cognitive therapies and hypnotherapy). 
Hill (1987) also performed a meta-analysis of this literature, including fifteen 
studies of empirical treatment-outcome data (nine of these studies were included in 
the Shoham-Salomon & Rosenthal [1987] study). Criteria for inclusion in this study 
required at least one comparison between a paradoxical Intervention and a control 
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group (which must have been no-treatment, placebo-control, or non-paradoxical 
treatment in nature), and a between-subjects design which measured therapeutic 
outcome. Effect size (Cohen's ^ was computed by subtracting the mean of the 
control group from the mean of the treatment group, then dividing by the standard 
deviation of the control group. 
Hill's (1987) conclusions suggested that paradoxical interventions were more 
effective than no-treatment control groups (mean effect size of 0.99). Paradoxical 
interventions were also more effective than placebo control groups (mean effect 
size of 0.56). These results are consistent with those of Shoham-Salomon and 
Rosenthal's (1987) study in stating that paradoxical interventions tend to produce 
favorable outcomes for clients when compared to other kinds of therapeutic 
interventions. In addition, Hill (1987) provided convergent evidence for the 
enhanced-impact of paradoxical interventions which incorporate a positive 
connotation. 
Hill (1987) provided the boldest interpretation to date by suggesting that 
paradoxical interventions may be more effective than non-paradoxical treatments. 
Today, the breadth of such a statement appears to be misguided given theoretical 
guidelines to utilize paradoxical interventions under appropriate circumstances, 
rather than in any given situation. Hill (1987) may have recognized this limitation to 
some degree when he noted that paradoxical interventions may be most effective 
with presenting problems that are more severe, or at least demonstrated to be 
treatment refractory when other therapeutic methods have been applied. 
Since the publication of these initial quantitative reviews, further research 
has provided data with which to guide the practitioner and spur future research. 
Akillas and Efran (1995) found that the use of symptom prescription combined with 
reframing was more effective than symptoms prescription without reframing and a 
wait-list control condition in treating socially anxious males. This finding supports 
previous clinical guidelines which advocated the use of a positive connotation to 
assist the client in reframing the meaning that client's associate with symptoms and 
solutions. 
Limitations of the Meta-Analvtic Research 
Although the research reviews just described support the conclusion that 
paradoxical interventions are generally effective within the context of 
psychotherapy, there are important limitations of this research which must be noted. 
Martinez-Taboas (1990) conducted a qualitative review and invoked the traditional 
cautions regarding the interpretations of meta-analytic data to temper the relatively 
enthusiastic conclusions of previous researchers (Shoham-Salomon and Rosenthal, 
1987; Hill, 1987). Specifically, Martinez-Taboas (1990) noted that Hill's use of 
average effect size with a small set of heterogeneous studies likely contributed to a 
distortion of clinical facts. Within the set of Hill's original studies, several limitations 
to clinical generalizability were noted, including: 14% of studies used a truly clinical 
population: five types of presenting problems were represented (67% of cases 
studied depression and insomnia); and therapy contexts were relatively contrived 
(43% of studies provided one total hour of therapy; 29% provided three or less total 
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hours). The relatively small number of studies of limited ecological validity should 
be considered a modest beginning In a research area from which only cautious 
interpretations can be gleaned. 
In addition, one might expect enhanced effect sizes in this literature, as the 
types of symptoms being treated in many of the studies have previously been 
suggested to have specific amenability to paradoxical therapy (i.e., insomnia, 
procrastination, agoraphobia). As with all programs of psychological research, 
appropriate cautions must be considered in interpreting empirical results. Definitive 
conclusions about the outcome and process of using paradoxical interventions are 
certainly premature at this point. However, the data that exist provide directions for 
future research and clinical practice. 
Guidelines for Therapeutic Use 
Procedural guidelines for the effective use of paradoxical interventions tend 
to be less specific than for more conventional psychotherapy techniques (which may 
be explicitly described as an extension of theory or even manualized). There is no 
unifying or standard set of instructions which uniquely characterizes paradoxical 
treatment strategies. This is certainly related to the fact that a variety of schools of 
therapy incorporate paradoxical interventions into their repertoire of treatment 
choices. Nevertheless, several guidelines have been suggested by leading authors 
in this area. 
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Dowd and Milne (1986) support the generally agreed-upon importance of 
having a strong therapeutic relationship with the client as a requisite condition for 
the effectiveness of therapeutic paradox. Paradoxes are to be used with careful 
attention to how the intervention fits with the particular client and the context of their 
treatment (Omer, 1986; Papp, 1980). Highly reactant clients may be well-suited for 
this form of treatment, as previously described in terms of defiance-based 
interventions. 
Weeks (1991) and Omer (1986) discuss the subtle importance of skillfully 
integrating paradoxical interventions into the therapy process. Therapists use 
paradoxical interventions to purposefully complement their treatment plans with 
clients. It is difficult to imagine a reason for conducting therapy with a completely 
paradoxical philosophy. A number of authors have noted the importance of 
therapist competency in using therapeutic paradox (Stanton, 1981; Brown & Slee, 
1986; Dowd & Milne, 1986; Ascher, 1989). The degree of sophistication involved in 
using such techniques requires that the novice receive careful supervision and 
training. 
Because of the paucity of process-oriented research to validate how 
paradoxical interventions are effective in assisting with client change, differential 
treatment guidelines based on diagnostic categories are not available. The 
empirical findings that are available have focused on the treatment of agoraphobia, 
insomnia, procrastination, and depression (Shoham-Salomon, Avner, & Neeman, 
1989). The case study literature is replete with accounts of the successful usage of 
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therapeutic paradox (DiTomasso & Greenberg, 1989; Stanton, 1981; Wilson & 
Bomstein, 1984). Examples of presenting problems that have been studied in this 
descriptive literature Include; anxiety disorders, simple and social phobias, 
compulsive gambling, eating disorders, substance abuse, psychosexual disorders, 
enuresis, relationship and family concerns, pain, and vocational indecision. 
Some contraindications are available in guiding the clinician in using 
paradoxical interventions. Behaviors or thoughts destructive to self or others should 
not be prescribed, encouraged, or exaggerated. The potential risk involved in such 
cases precludes the use of strategic paradox, and should be addressed with more 
appropriate methods of crisis intervention. Sociopathic or paranoid clients may 
present unstable personality characteristics which present risks for extreme 
exacerbation of injurious behaviors (Weeks & L'Abate, 1982). Highly chaotic 
marriages and families also tend to be less appropriate candidates for paradoxical 
interventions. The appropriateness of any intervention given the context of the 
treatment involves congruence with the research literature and careful consideration 
of relevant ethical issues. 
To return to the primary argument levied against paradoxical interventions, 
many perceive these interventions to be manipulative or coercive (Perrin & Dowd, 
1986). Subtle coercion of a patient is still coercion, and a client's perception that a 
therapist has been manipulative can be associated with disrespect, and may be 
anti-therapeutic. Although some contend that therapeutic paradox is simply too 
manipulative, others argue that all therapy is manipulation, and that the most skillful 
manipulators find ways to promote client change (Beahms, 1977). Further ethical 
concerns are then raised about the potential damage to a therapeutic relationship 
should such manipulation become apparent. Brown and Slee (1986) provide further 
discussion of the issues of coercion and trust in the practice of using paradoxical 
interventions. 
Ethical Issues 
Ethical concerns about paradoxical interventions are associated with the 
notion that such strategies are tricky or manipulative (Perrin & Dowd, 1986). Such 
concerns are most often based upon the procedural recommendation that the 
rationale for the intervention be withheld from the client-to do otherwise would 
jeopardize the potential effectiveness of the intervention. Haley (1963, 1984) and 
many others have explained that commenting on the double bind allows the client to 
see the logical constraints being presented, thus permitting escape from the double 
bind. Indeed, one might expect a highly reactant client to be motivated to oppose 
the influence of a therapist; this may be particularly so If the intervention strategy is 
deemed somehow subversive and manipulative. In this case, one is not changed 
regardless of compliance or defiance, as the Intervention has been rendered 
irrelevant (via disclosure of the treatment rationale). Haley further suggested 
"...although a therapist might want to 'share' with a client and explain what he Is 
really doing, the risk Is a relapse caused by the therapist's need for comfort" (Haley, 
1976, p.74). 
Brown and Slee (1986) also introduced discussion about the extent to which 
paradoxical interventions may violate the intent of informed consent to treatment. 
As was mentioned previously, marked differences of opinion exist with regard to the 
role of the rationale. When no rationale Is given, do clients truly have complete 
information about the nature of treatment for which we ask their consent? While an 
argument can be made that therapists do not typically provide full theoretical 
rationale for all of the skills used in a session, the unique nature of paradoxical 
interventions may be a notable exception to this argument. 
The Therapeutic Rationale 
Although some therapists believe that no rationale should be available for 
clients, others take variable positions on the degree of disclosure of therapeutic 
intent. Nondisclosure rationales provide the client with some explanation for the 
directive, but do not allow for revelation of the double-bind concept. Boettcher and 
Dowd (1988) utilized nondisclosure rationales to offer clients a believable reason to 
follow the intervention. Examples of nondisclosure rationales include positive 
reframing, assigning some positive connotation to the targeted symptom (e.g., 
depressive symptoms are actually coping skills to wisely retreat from stress and 
take better care of oneself), prescribing a symptom to enhance awareness of the 
problem, and assigning symptoms in order to gather baseline data for future 
interventions (Boettcher & Dowd, 1988). 
On the other hand, disclosure rationales reveal the logic of the inten/ention 
based on the assumption that this insight will render the intervention more 
successful and more ethical than if the rationale were withheld. The theoretical 
nature of these rationales may vary by therapist, but the spirit of full disclosure of 
the expected mechanism of action is present. Frankl's use of paradoxical intention 
in logotherapy is an example of instructing the client (with the use of humor) that an 
increase in symptoms is not desired, but is merely a means to the opposite effect 
(Hills, et al., 1985). 
Hill (1992) described a very respectful application of feminist therapy to the 
use of paradoxical interventions in general, and to the specific question of whether 
or not to provide a therapeutic rationale. Her "open paradox" is characterized by 
sharing the intended rationale and providing as much information as would be 
useful to the client. The effort to involve the client in an egalitarian treatment 
process is intended to empower the client to effect his or her own changes, rather 
than to rely on the direction of a therapist. Hill's (1992) use of therapeutic paradox 
within a feminist conceptualization addresses a number of the relationship issues of 
deception, trust, and power that have been raised by many others. 
Empirical Studies of the Rationale 
The empirical literature contains only three studies and yields inconclusive 
evidence to determine the role of the rationale in therapeutic outcome. A number of 
analog studies (typically measuring counselor social influence variables) have been 
published. Ascher and Turner (1980) reported a study of subjects who were 
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administered a paradoxical directive for symptoms of insomnia. They utilized 
disclosure rationales (whereby the expected mechanism of change was provided to 
the client as part of the intervention) and nondisclosure rationales (whereby clients 
were given an explanation that does not reveal the true expected mechanism of 
change, but offers a more vague description of the need to learn more about the 
problem in order to arrive at solutions). Subjects in their study who received a 
disclosure rationale were superior to subjects who received a nondisclosure 
rationale in terms of reducing sleep onset latency, in lessening the difficulty in 
returning to sleep, and in higher subjects' ratings of restedness. The therapeutic 
outcomes of subjects who received the nondisclosure rationale were not discernible 
from either of two control groups (Ascher & Turner, 1980). 
Hills, Gruszkos, and Strong (1985) concluded that providing an explanation 
of the mechanism of change may actually diminish the effectiveness of the 
intervention. In their study with moderately depressed college students, their fonns 
of rationale were essentially a no rationale condition, a nondisclosure rationale 
condition that involved reframing and a disclosure rationale which explained the 
therapeutic double bind. Results indicated that, in comparison to the no rationale 
condition, the two conditions which employed rationales that disclosed the nature of 
the intervention were associated with more favorable ratings of the counselor and 
more internalized attributions for client change. However, the disclosure conditions 
were associated with lesser therapeutic outcome. 
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Boettcher and Dowd (1988) incorporated four treatment conditions in their 
study utilizing symptom prescription with anxious college students; no rationale, a 
positive reframe rationale, a performance anxiety rationale, and a double bind 
rationale. Their results indicated that all clients made therapeutic gains regardless 
of condition, while none of the treatment group comparisons were significant in 
terms of therapeutic outcome and social influence ratings of the counselor. 
March (1993) presented videotaped counseling vignettes to undergraduate 
students in a study which tested the potentially moderating effects of psychological 
reactance and need for cognition on ratings of counselors who administered 
paradoxical interventions with and without a treatment rationale. Subjects who 
viewed the counselor who provided a rationale were more willing to see the 
videotaped counselor for a variety of concerns than were subjects who viewed the 
counselor that did not offer a rationale. Higher levels of reactance corresponded 
with lower favorable ratings of the counselor regardless of whether or not a 
rationale was present. 
These studies yield a mixed message to clinicians searching for the position 
that is both empirically validated and clinically ethical, it may be that studies have 
not been adequate in number and quality to sufficiently address the question of 
whether or not to provide a rationale for paradoxical interventions. On the other 
hand, perhaps it matters less what kind of rationale is offered, provided that some 
credible rationale is given (Akillas and Efran, 1995). 
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Summary: Ethical Concerns and the Rationale 
The majority of ethical concerns surrounding the use of therapeutic paradox 
are associated with attributions of manipulation on the behalf of the therapist. The 
process of prescribing those symptoms from which the client is seeking relief has 
been characterized as deceptive and coercive-and against sound ethical standards 
of practice. Ethical issues of informed consent are compounded when theoretical 
guidelines indicate the withholding of a rationale for this form of treatment. The 
empirical literature provides inconclusive evidence for the clinician. 
In addition to the controversy over the rationale, there is no consensus on 
how paradoxical interventions lead to positive client change. Double-bind theory 
has been used to explain the mechanism of therapeutic action in terms of 
administering an intervention which proposes client change whether the client 
complies or defies the directive. There is modest support in the literature for 
considering client reactance potential as an individual difference variable which may 
indicate the use of a form of paradoxical intervention. However, little is known 
about the extent to which licensed psychologists use this variable in making 
decisions about using paradoxical interventions. The following section outlines the 
findings from the literature on the treatment acceptability of paradoxical 
interventions. 
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Treatment Acceptability 
Treatment acceptability was defined by Kazdin (1981) as judgments about 
the fairness, appropriateness, and reasonableness of treatment procedures for 
clients or their problems. Elliott (1988) noted that Wolfs (1978) work on social 
validity provides a basis for the importance of treatment acceptability, suggesting 
that the validity of behavioral interventions will in part be determined at a societal 
level. The literature on the treatment acceptability of paradoxical Interventions Is 
limited In size, and has yielded inconclusive findings. These findings are outlined 
here, followed by ways In which the proposed study intends to meaningfully add to 
this literature. This literature also contains several conceptual articles which 
present various positions regarding the acceptability of therapeutic paradox. This 
section will include those arguments. 
Hunsley (1993) reported two studies that examined treatment acceptability 
ratings of symptom prescription relative to ratings of alternative treatment strategies 
for procrastination. In the first study, university students were measured for degree 
of personality characteristics (Machiavellianism—interpersonal manipulatlveness, 
and reactance), both of which were used as covarlates in data analyses. Subjects 
were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions In which a clinical vignette 
was read. The four conditions represented the possible combinations of two types 
of intervention rationales (compliance- and defiance-based; Rohrbaugh, et al., 
1981) and previous treatment history of the client in the vignette (unsuccessful 
treatment history and no treatment history). Subjects then rated the acceptability of 
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the intervention using the Treatment Acceptability Questionnaire (TAQ; Hunsley, 
1992), and rated their own difficulty with procrastination. This final, one-item rating 
was used as an additional covariate. Results of the first study showed no main 
effects or interaction effects, nonsignificant effects of the covariates, and ratings 
that indicated that subjects perceived the intervention to be acceptable. 
The second study in Hunsley's report (1993) compared treatment 
acceptability ratings between symptom prescription and a behavioral intervention. 
Again, university subjects participated in reading clinical vignettes and responding 
on the TAQ. The same covariates were used in this study as were used In the first 
study. The results of the second study Indicated no significant covariate effects. 
The behavioral intervention was rated as more acceptable than the symptom 
prescription strategy, and both interventions were rated as acceptable in an 
absolute sense (i.e., above the midpoint on the TAQ). 
Hunsley and LeFebvre (1991) surveyed 88 Canadian clinical psychologists' 
views of the treatment acceptability of paradoxical techniques. Their results 
indicated that the acceptability of paradoxical techniques was generally related to 
theoretical orientation in the predicted direction. Specifically, psychologists who 
described themselves as "strategic/systemic" rated paradoxical techniques as more 
acceptable than did those whose orientation was described as "other." However, 
results indicated that respondents perceived paradoxical techniques to be ethical in 
an absolute sense, regardless of orientation. Second, ratings of acceptability were 
not associated with levels of therapist Machiavellianism-a trait measure of 
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manipulativeness in interpersonal relationships. Third, acceptability ratings were 
not related to the type of rationale offered in a clinical vignette, nor to the availability 
of treatment history information. 
Some of the limitations of this published study are the lack of a fully crossed 
research design, limited response rate (29%), and the broadly defined theoretical 
orientation measurement (e.g., psychologists were classified as "strategic/systemic" 
or "other"). Further, the sophistication of the research subjects may have rendered 
the assessment of Machiavellianism rather transparent, possibly diminishing the 
impact of this measured variable in the analyses. 
Betts and Remer (1993) offered undergraduate students the option of 
participation in a semester-long family simulation project as an alternative to writing 
an in-depth autobiographical term paper. In an interesting paradigm, they 
instructed subjects to play roles in a fabricated family situation involving a rebellious 
adolescent daughter. These simulated families were involved in four role-playing 
exercises, one family therapy session, and then received a letter from the session 
therapist which contained an intervention (either paradoxical or nonparadoxical). 
The results indicated that the paradoxical interventions did not negatively influence 
the social influence variables of expertness, attractiveness, and trustworthiness. 
Although both interventions were deemed acceptable in an absolute sense, the 
nonparadoxical intervention was rated more acceptable than the paradoxical 
intervention. 
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Hirschman and Sprenkle (1989) conducted an exploratory survey of clinical 
members of the American Association of Marriage and Family Therapy (AAMFT), 
hypothesizing that the users and non-users of paradoxical interventions are 
characteristically different. Compared to non-users, users of paradoxical 
techniques tended to be younger, had less clinical experience, saw themselves as 
more directive in therapy, received more supervision, and were less concerned 
about the ethical issues associated with the use of paradoxical interventions. Users 
reported symptom prescription, positioning, restraining, and ordeal techniques (in 
that order) as the techniques most often used, although their rationales for 
mechanism of change varied. The authors concluded that users of paradox are 
made, not born. Additionally, they called for increased theoretical grounding in the 
process of training therapists to use paradoxical interventions. 
Cavell, Frentz, and Kelly (1986) asked middle school and high school 
teachers to rate the treatment acceptability of paradoxical (four different kinds of 
rationale) and nonparadoxical (continue with an unsuccessful contingency contract) 
techniques. The interventions were presented in case vignettes about treating 
truant and disruptive adolescents, and subjects rated the overall acceptability of the 
intervention, willingness to carry out the intervention, and the risk of adverse side 
effects of the intervention. Cavell et at. (1986) reported that the teachers rated 
paradoxical interventions as generally unacceptable treatment options. These 
acceptability ratings were significantly lower than the ratings for the nonparadoxical 
condition. 
Treatment Acceptability: Critique and Recommendations 
The literature on the treatment acceptability of paradoxical interventions is 
limited in size, but the early studies do provide a foundation for the proposed study. 
Three studies have reported that paradoxical interventions are generally rated as 
less acceptable than non-paradoxical treatment groups (Hunsley, 1993; Betts & 
Remer, 1993; Cavell et al., 1986). Two of these three studies (Hunsley, 1993; Betts 
& Remer, 1993) showed that although less acceptable than a more conventional 
alternative, paradoxical interventions were still rated as acceptable in an absolute 
sense, whereas the other (Cavell, et al., 1986) showed an overall unacceptable 
rating for paradoxical interventions. Hirschmann and Sprenkle (1988) noted that 
users of paradox tend to differ on a number of demographic variables (including 
their findings that users tend to be younger, have less clinical experience, and 
tended to see themselves as more directive in therapy when compared to non-
users). A number of methodological limitations hamper the studies in this field-
attempts will be made to improve upon the current body of literature. 
A number of methodological limitations compromise the validity of the 
aforementioned results. First, Hunsley (1993) indicated that his studies may have 
suffered from inadequate power to detect group differences in treatment 
acceptability. While most researchers have studied the acceptability ratings of 
students or other potential consumers, only one of the studies (Hunsley & 
LeFebvre, 1991) used clinician rating of acceptability to address the ethical issues 
in question. This is a very useful perspective to examine, as acceptability ratings 
based upon full understanding of theoretical rationale provide information about 
professional perceptions of an appropriate standard of practice. 
In addition to establishing such a standard, this study also proposed to 
further elucidate the role of client reactance potential (a client personality variable 
assumed to be relevant to the mechanism of action) in the process of determining 
the acceptability of a paradoxical intervention. Also, the role of the rationale (a 
point of procedural and ethical contention) was studied in terms of the contribution 
this variable makes in clinicians' decision making processes. To date, the literature 
that exists on all of these issues provides only minimal guidance to the clinician 
searching for an appropriate standard of practice when considering the use of 
paradoxical interventions. 
The inconclusiveness of the literature may in part be due to the exclusion of 
important variables which influence professional's ratings of treatment acceptability. 
Such a variable might be associated with ethical dilemmas or perceived threats to 
social validity. A unique feature of this study was the addition of a mediational 
model which includes the role of cognitive dissonance—a therapist variable that has 
not yet been studied in relation to this ethically contentious topic. The following 
section outlines key elements of dissonance theory, and relates these concepts to 
clinical decision making about the use of paradoxical interventions. 
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Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
In 1957, Leon Festinger presented his theory of cognitive dissonance-an 
early theory of cognitive consistency that has been one of the most influential in 
psychology. Festinger introduced a theoretical formulation which stated that 
cognitive dissonance is a negative state that emerges when a person is 
experiencing discomfort secondary to holding two psychologically inconsistent 
cognitions (Aronson, 1969). Further, the person experiencing this negative state is 
assumed to be motivated to reduce this state, often resulting in changes in attitude 
or behavior (Festinger, 1957). 
The induced compliance research paradigm was begun to test the original 
theory. Festinger and Carlsmlth (1959) conducted an experiment in which subjects 
(college students) were required to inform peers that consecutive tasks (emptying 
and refilling a tray with spools and turning square pegs on a tray one-quarter turn, 
each task for one-half hour) In which they had engaged and perceived to be boring 
was actually quite interesting and exciting. Behaviorally making a statement which 
was contrary to their private cognitions was assumed to have aroused dissonance. 
In order to reduce this dissonance, it was hypothesized that subjects would change 
their private cognition about the task ("It was boring") to become more consonant 
with their behavioral cognition ("I told my fellow student 'It was exciting!"'). In 
addition, Festinger and Carlsmlth (1959) varied the amount of reward that was given 
to subjects who were induced to mislead their peers. Subjects were assigned to 
one of three conditions: A control condition In which no public opinion was offered 
to a peer, but subjects were evaluated; a $1 condition in which subjects received $1 
for their duping of a peer; and a $20 condition which provided $20 to the subject for 
lying to a peer. 
Festlnger and Carlsmith (1959) found that subjects In the $1 condition 
showed more attitude change regarding the original task relative to the $20 and the 
control conditions. These results were interpreted as consistent with the proposed 
cognitive dissonance theory, suggesting that "If a person Is induced to do or say 
something which Is contrary to his private opinion, there will be a tendency for him 
to change his opinion so as to bring It into correspondence with what he has done 
or said," and 'The larger the pressure used to elicit the overt behavior (beyond the 
minimum needed to elicit it) the weaker will be the above-mentioned tendency." 
(Festlnger & Carlsmith, 1959, pp. 209-210). 
Through an explosion of research on this theory, the original formulation has 
evolved to become a much more sophisticated explanation of attitude-discrepant 
behavior (Aronson 1969; Cooper and Fazio, 1984; Worchel, Cooper, and Goethels 
1988). Cooper and Fazio (1984) reported that more than 1000 published research 
articles have been produced which Involved tests of dissonance theory. Berkowltz 
and Devine (1989) cited Aronson as stating that there has been diminished interest 
in studying dissonance theory, and that some published research findings that could 
have been predicted by dissonance theory formulations do not mention such a 
conceptualization. Dissonance theory was used as an example by Berkowltz and 
Devine (1989) to make a point that social psychological research In recent years 
has been characterized by declining interest in motivational psychology in favor of 
cognitive models and striving to be theoretically innovative. The authors also note 
that social psychology has relegated dissonance theory to the status of elderiy 
relative: "We know that Uncle Louie exists, but we never go to visit him" (p. 494). 
A Revision of Dissonance Theory 
Cooper and Fazio (1984) provide a synthesis of research findings that adds 
greater complexity to the original propositions of cognitive dissonance theory. 
These authors suggested that dissonance as it had previously been used should be 
differentiated into dissonance arousal and dissonance motivation. Dissonance 
arousal is described as a general, undifferentiated state that is necessary but not 
sufficient in the dissonance-produced attitude change process. Mere arousal is not 
sufficient because a person could interpret the arousal as a positive state (thus not 
leading to a motivation to reduce the affective response) or misattribute the arousal 
to an external source (rather than to inconsistencies within the self). In either of 
these cases, attitude change is not likely to occur. If, on the other hand, the 
dissonance arousal state is interpreted as negative, and the person experiencing 
arousal is willing to take responsibility for any potential negative consequences that 
could occur as a result of behavior that is associated with the inconsistent cognition, 
then dissonance motivation can occur. In this way, dissonance motivation is 
necessary for attitude change. Persons may avoid attitude change via dissonance 
reduction strategies (Festinger, 1957). 
The central premise of this study was that some clinicians may experience 
cognitive dissonance when faced with having used a paradoxical intervention. 
Thus, upon presenting subjects with a therapeutic situation (depicted in a written 
vignette) in which they will be using a paradoxical intervention, some subjects 
(predicted by assignment to experimental conditions and secondary predictor 
variables) were expected to experience dissonance arousal. Cooper and Fazio's 
(1984) review of dissonance research suggests a number of conditions that must be 
present in order for dissonance arousal to occur. Specifically, these conditions are: 
1) the subject must perceive that aversive consequences may occur subsequent to 
their counterattitudinal behavior; 2) the consequences of their behavior must be 
perceived as irrevocable: and 3) the subject must perceive responsibility for the 
behavior. 
There have been challenges to Cooper and Fazio's (1984) revision of 
cognitive dissonance theory (Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon, & Nelson, 
1996; Berkowitz & Devine, 1989). Such challenges suggest that the proposed 
revisions have constrained Festinger's original proposal of a rather robust 
phenomena associated with cognitive inconsistency. Critics suggest that the three 
conditions (listed in the previous paragraph) proposed by Cooper and Fazio are not 
necessarily required to elicit cognitive dissonance, but may intensify the state of 
emotional arousal. Even though there is no intention of changing subjects' attitudes 
about paradoxical interventions in this study (via the induced compliance paradigm). 
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efforts were made to represent those three conditions to maximize the degree of 
dissonance which subjects may experience. 
These three conditions will be described briefly and placed in the context of 
this study in order to establish a sound theoretical basis for the hypothesis that 
some clinicians experience dissonance arousal related to the choice of whether or 
not to use paradox. Further, dissonance reduction strategies are described and 
related to therapeutic decision-making attitudes and behaviors related to the use or 
non-use of paradoxical interventions. Specific hypotheses that logically flow from 
this theoretical discussion will follow. 
Conditions for Dissonance Arousal 
Aversive Consequences 
The first condition needed for the presence of dissonance arousal requires 
that the person must perceive that aversive consequences may follow the 
counterattitudinal behavior. Merely holding inconsistent cognitions does not lead to 
such arousal. Cooper, Zanna, and Goethels (1974) conducted a study to test the 
hypothesis that the consequences must be aversive. Consider the previously 
described Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) induced compliance study. In such a 
study, deceiving a peer with regard to the degree of interest held during a boring 
task presents the subject with two inconsistent cognitions, but the deception itself is 
not necessarily aversive. Cooper et al. (1974) produced conditions that led to a 
greater likelihood of experiencing discomfort with the deception by creating two 
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conditions in which their subjects were led to either like or dislike the peer who was 
about to be deceived (a confederate). All experimental subjects were presented 
with the same counterattitudinal task of convincing a peer that a boring task was 
exciting. However, the presence of inconsistent cognitions was not sufficient to lead 
to dissonance-aroused attitude change. Only those subjects who perceived that 
they successfully deceived a liked peer actually changed their attitude regarding the 
task. Cooper et al. (1974) concluded that this manipulation of the degree to which 
the deceived peer was liked led to results supporting their hypotheses that the 
consequences of counterattitudinal behavior must be perceived as aversive. 
Cooper and Fazio (1984) add that the aversive consequences need not 
actually occur to lead to dissonance arousal. The unwanted or unpleasant 
consequences must be perceived as possible. These perceptions that are 
associated with the agreement to engage in counterattitudinal behavior are the 
essence of this first condition of dissonance arousal. Recent research supports the 
notion that aversive consequences do not have to be produced in order to arouse 
cognitive dissonance (Harmon-Jones et al., 1996). 
Clinicians faced with the decision to use paradoxical interventions may 
perceive aversive consequences, regardless of whether or not they are proponents 
of this technique. Therapists who are fundamentally opposed to therapeutic 
paradox on the basis that such maneuvers are manipulative would be expected to 
experience dissonance arousal when the task at hand is to prescribe a symptom. 
The aversive consequences may include risking the integrity of the therapeutic 
relationship (via perceived manipulation or deception; Perrin & Dowd, 1986), 
compromising therapist credibility (If the treatment is ineffective, or if the client 
escapes the paradoxical double-bind), exacerbating the presenting problem, or 
bringing therapy to a "dead-end" situation (Omer, 1986). Similarly, a clinician who 
does not use these techniques for theoretical reasons or because of lack of 
exposure to theory may also find the choice to work paradoxically to be aversive. In 
such cases, the unpredictability of consequences may be an aversive, unwanted 
state. 
Even those who choose to use paradoxical interventions may experience 
dissonance when the conditions presented in the case run counter to their own 
theoretical grounding for using such a strategy. As previously discussed in this 
paper, there are Indications and contraindications for the use of paradoxical 
interventions, as well as varying guidelines for implementation of the intervention. 
For some clinicians, the presence of high client reactance potential is required 
before the paradox may be used (e.g., as a defiance-based strategy). Others may 
have particular positions regarding the presence or absence of the rationale based 
on theoretical orientation and perceived role of professional ethics and informed 
consent. Hence, it is possible for a range of clinicians to perceive the potential for 
aversive consequences when presented with the vignettes in the proposed study. 
Irrevocability of Behavior 
Associated with the condition of aversive consequences is another condition 
that the consequences of the counterattltudinal behavior must be perceived as 
irrevocable. For example, in the aforementioned Cooper et al. (1974) study, the 
subjects experienced dissonance arousal when they believed that they had 
deceived a liked peer. The condition of irrevocability would also require that 
subjects perceive that the counterattitudinal behavior could not be undone via some 
means of discounting the deception (e.g., such as confessing to telling a lie only as 
a part of a research study, then relaying a description of the task that is more 
congruent with true personal perception of the task). Davis and Jones (1960) 
conducted an experiment of this condition in which they assigned subjects to deliver 
counterattltudinal, negative, personal descriptions of a peer. Half of the subjects 
believed that they would have an opportunity to revoke this statement in a meeting 
with the peer prior to the presentation of the description, whereas the other half had 
no expectation of this opportunity. Results showed that only those subjects who 
believed their statements were irrevocable actually produced attitude change as a 
result of the experience of dissonance. 
When therapists deliver paradoxical interventions, the common procedure is 
t 
to assign the intervention at or near the end of a counseling session. Once the 
intervention has been delivered and the session has ended, it is unlikely that the 
therapist will take the opportunity to rescind the intervention and reveal that such a 
strategy runs counter to how that particular therapist conducts therapy. In this 
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study, the delivery of paradoxical interventions was assumed to be 
counterattitudinal for some respondents, partly based on conditions of the 
presented vignettes, and partly based on their own theoretical orientations to 
therapy. For practical purposes, once the symptom is prescribed or scheduled, this 
therapist behavior was considered irrevocable. 
Further, the role of the therapeutic rationale has direct application to the 
condition of irrevocability. Some explanations of how paradoxical interventions 
work (previously described) require that no rationale for the intervention be 
provided, lest the client escape the therapeutic double-bind-rendering the 
Intervention ineffective. For those who perceive paradoxical interventions as 
unacceptable, providing a rationale (one that explains the expected mechanism of 
change) under such conditions can be seen as revoking the counterattitudinal 
behavior. Some rationales, by intent and effect, do not reveal the mechanism of 
change, and thus do not effectively revoke the behavior. Such rationales would 
likely continue to contribute to dissonance arousal, as the intervention (and the 
associated risks to the therapy process) would be perceived as irrevocable. 
Subjects in this study were not induced to actually perfonn a paradoxical 
intervention for purposes of measuring dissonance arousal. Rather, a scripted case 
vignette was used as a stimulus for respondents. Recent research has justifiably 
raised concerns over the limited generalizability of analogue research designs 
(Heppner and Claibom, 1989). With regard to dissonance research, however, 
Cooper and Fazio (1984) note: "It is the subjects perception that negative 
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consequences will result from their actions that are important. In fact, there is 
abundant research indicating that event the counterattitudinai behavior itself can be 
anticipated rather than experienced" (p. 235). 
Subjects in this study were asked to imagine themselves performing the 
behavior of prescribing symptoms, and to anticipate their resultant thoughts and 
feelings about such a choice. Some subjects were expected to experience 
imagined dissonance based on their perceptions that the use of symptom 
prescription would lead to negative consequences. The presence and amount of 
dissonance was predicted to be a function of subject characteristics and 
experimental conditions. Gibbons (3/4/96, personal communication) indicated that 
measuring dissonance arousal is difficult, particulariy when the person is actively 
engaged in a highly significant state of arousal. It appears that the nature of such a 
state of psychological tension may actually be the greatest impediment to 
measuring it's presence. Enhancing the perceived responsibility of the subjects in 
this study was the next important task. 
Perceived Resoonsibilitv 
The role of perceived responsibility is a third condition required for the 
arousal of dissonance (Cooper & Fazio, 1984). A number of researchers have 
suggested that persons who perceive themselves to have the choice to behave in a 
counterattitudinai manner are more likely to experience dissonance than their 
counterparts (Davis & Jones, 1960; Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967; Sherman, 1970; 
Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). In addition to perceiving the freedom to choose a 
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behavior, the aversive consequences of the behavior must be foreseeable. The 
subject must have been able to anticipate that the consequences would be 
aversive. Thus, research suggests that a person must make an internal attribution 
for irrevocably causing a foreseeable, aversive event in order for dissonance 
arousal to occur. 
Therapists are responsible for choosing the theoretical approaches and 
interventions which they believe to be most appropriate and likely to contribute to 
successful outcomes (Beutler and Clarkin, 1990). Therapists have high freedom of 
choice to select intervention strategies. Based on careful assessment of the client 
and knowledge of various treatment approaches, certain kinds of therapy outcomes 
may be foreseen. This is the basis for the treatment selection process. Those 
therapists who do not advocate the use of paradoxical interventions are 
hypothesized to hold this position based on the perception that aversive 
consequences would be foreseeable If such an intervention were chosen. In clinical 
settings, therapists hold personal responsibility for their behaviors and the 
consequences of those behaviors. 
In this study, an element of public commitment was included in an attempt to 
enhance the likelihood that subjects would perceive personal responsibility for the 
decision to use symptom prescription. This was done by including a statement in 
the vignette which indicated that the imagined case was to be presented at the next 
agency case conference. Gibbons (3/4/96, personal communication) recommended 
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the inclusion of such a commitment in an attempt to further enhance the perception 
that subjects bear some accountability for the choice of Intervention. 
Dissonance Arousal in the Present Studv 
Thus, the three conditions required for the arousal of cognitive dissonance 
were incorporated into the design of this study. As was previously mentioned, there 
were potentially aversive consequences to the choice to prescribe a symptom-
regardless of the position that therapists hold regarding paradoxical interventions. 
Second, once a paradoxical intervention has been delivered, the therapist message 
was (for all practical purposes) irrevocable. This may be particularly applicable 
when no rationale for the intervention is provided. Third, therapists assume 
personal responsibility for their behaviors in the context of treatment, and should 
also strive (via the guidance of theory and ongoing assessment) to foresee the 
consequences of such behaviors. Persons who experience dissonance arousal 
according to these conditions may be expected to engage in a number of cognitive 
or behavioral strategies to reduce this negative state of arousal. 
Dissonance Reduction 
In the induced compliance research paradigm, dissonance arousal is 
requisite for the presence of dissonance motivation-a drive to alleviate the negative 
arousal state by changing one's attitude. The theory holds that a person is 
motivated to change the attitude that initially contradicted the induced behavior. 
However, this study does not intend to change attitudes regarding the acceptability 
of paradoxical intentions by forcing compliance with the practice of paradoxical 
interventions. Although this may be possible, this is an issue that reaches beyond 
the purpose of this study. Rather than change their attitudes regarding paradoxical 
interventions, it was hypothesized that some therapists in this study will experience 
dissonance arousal, and then engage in dissonance reduction strategies. 
Aronson (1969) discussed the importance of self-concept to dissonance 
theory. He stated: 'Thus, at the very heart of dissonance theory, where it makes its 
clearest and neatest prediction, we are not dealing with any two cognitions; rather, 
we are usually dealing with the self-concept and cognitions about some behaviors. 
If dissonance exists, it is because the individual's behavior is inconsistent with his 
self-concept." (Aronson, 1969, p.27). There must be some personal relevance 
involved in the study, such that the subject experiences an aversive state 
associated with an irrevocable action for which the subject perceives responsibility. 
The experience of aversiveness arises when a proposed behavior (e.g., prescribing 
symptoms of anxiety) is perceived to be inconsistent with core beliefs about the self 
(e.g., as assessed by attitudes regarding therapy and theoretical orientation). 
Behaviors that do not threaten core aspects of the self may not arouse dissonance. 
In this manner, some of the subjects in this study may not experience dissonance 
arousal, and will rate paradoxical interventions as acceptable. 
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Dissonance Reduction in the Present Study 
In this study, it was hypothesized that some subjects who experience 
dissonance arousal will engage is some form of dissonance reduction in order to 
preserve their cognitions associated with self-concept. Based on their review of the 
literature, Cooper and Fazio (1984) outlined a number of alternatives to attitude 
change in which persons may engage to reduce dissonance. First, subjects may 
reassess the dissonance arousal situation and shift their perceptions regarding the 
source of the arousal by misattributing the emotion to another event. Second, 
subjects may reassess the potential consequences of their counterattitudinal 
behavior by minimizing or ignoring the nature of the consequences. A third 
reduction strategy is an attempt to atone for their counterattitudinal behavior, 
perhaps by attempting to re-establish the strength of their original attitude (which 
represents the self-concept). 
In this study, it was hypothesized that subjects who oppose the use of 
paradoxical interventions as unacceptable will experience dissonance arousal when 
in an experimental condition requiring them to advocate the use of such an 
intervention. These persons were not expected to change their attitudes regarding 
paradoxical interventions. However, it was hypothesized that they will engage in 
reduction strategies as a means of reducing the negative affect of dissonance 
arousal. 
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Items were written to represent reduction strategies (as outlined above) In 
which clinicians might reasonably engage to preserve their cognitions associated 
with their personal and professional self-concept. The process of misattrlbuting the 
arousal to another event In order to reduce dissonance was captured In the 
following items: "I am concerned that the clinical utility of paradoxical Interventions 
has not yet been sufficiently demonstrated," and 'The influence of managed care in 
the practice of psychology encourages the use of provocative interventions." The 
process of minimizing or ignoring the nature of the consequences of the 
counterattudinal behavior In order to reduce dissonance was captured In these 
items: "I am not personally responsible for any manipulation that Chris may 
perceive," and "Chris's symptoms are mild enough that prescribing an exacerbation 
is not clinically risky." Finally, the process of reducing dissonance by re­
establishing the strength of the original attitude was captured in these two items: 
"Failure of the symptom prescription is attributable to the Intervention itself, not to 
my own lack of skill," and "My ethical concerns about paradoxical Interventions 
make this a poor choice of intervention." 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The primary hypothesis of this study was that the variables rationale, client 
reactance potential, and clinician experience with paradoxical interventions will be 
associated with varying levels of treatment acceptability. This relationship was 
hypothesized to be mediated by the arousal of cognitive dissonance, which may be 
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reduced via dissonance reduction strategies. Clinician experience is expected to 
interact with the manipulated variables (presence or absence of therapeutic 
rationale, and high or low level of client reactance potential). Four manipulated 
conditions will be used in a written vignette, which are as follows: 1) rationale 
present, high client reactance potential: 2) rationale absent, hioh client reactance 
potential: 3) rationale present, low client reactance potential: and 4^ rationale 
absent, low client reactance potential. A control group was not used in this 
multivariate, predictive design. The four conditions are presented in Figure 1. 
High Reactance 
Low Reactance 
Rationale Rationale 
Present Absent 
1 2 
3 4 
Figure 1. Treatment conditions 
Hypotheses for Multiple Regression Analyses 
This study proposed that three predictor variables (presence or absence of a 
therapeutic rationale, level of client reactance potential, and respondent experience 
with paradoxical interventions) would be predictive of psychologists' ratings of three 
criterion variables (treatment acceptability of paradoxical interventions, level of 
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dissonance arousal, and use of dissonance reduction strategies). The rationale and 
reactance variables were experimentally manipulated in a clinical vignette, whereas 
respondent experience with paradoxical interventions were measured with items 
regarding exposure, frequency of use, and general attitudes toward such 
interventions. The criterion variables were measured with empirically validated 
items and face-valid items generated by the investigator. The predictive 
relationships among these variables were tested with multiple regression analyses. 
General Hypotheses 
Two general hypotheses were generated with regard to the relationships 
among the criterion variables. First, a negative relationship was expected between 
ratings of treatment acceptability and level of dissonance arousal. Thus, it was 
hypothesized that as subjects' level of cognitive dissonance heightens (when 
confronted with the circumstance of having administered a paradoxical 
intervention), their subsequent treatment acceptability ratings of the intervention 
itself will be lower as a function of this state of discomfort. A higher level of tension 
was hypothesized to be associated with lower ratings of acceptability. Conversely, 
as levels of dissonance arousal are lower, ratings of treatment acceptability are 
expected to be higher. Second, a positive relationship between dissonance arousal 
and dissonance reduction strategies was expected. Thus, it was hypothesized that 
as subjects' levels of dissonance arousal lowers, their endorsement of items which 
measure dissonance reduction will lower. Conversely, as levels of dissonance 
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arousal are lower, endorsement of dissonance reduction strategies was expected to 
also be lower (there should be no need to reduce a nonexistent state of arousal). 
Theoretical orientation of clinicians was hypothesized to be associated with 
higher ratings of treatment acceptability for those clinicians whose descriptions of 
their own therapeutic style are higher on dimensions of directiveness and level of 
activity and spontaneity. In addition, because of the significant presence in the 
empirical and case study literature, higher ratings on orientations of 
cognitive/rational, behavioral, systemic, and eclectic/integrative approaches were 
expected to be associated with higher ratings of treatment acceptability of 
paradoxical interventions. The demographic variables age and years of experience 
were expected to be associated with ratings of treatment acceptability of 
paradoxical interventions, such that as age and years of experience Increase, 
treatment acceptabi l i ty rat ings were be expected to. 
Recall that in this particular study including cognitive dissonance theory, 
there was no induced compliance paradigm employed for the purpose of measuring 
attitude change. Attitude change was not expected from these experimental 
manipulations, but the presence of dissonance arousal is expected to emerge. The 
following hypotheses were generated to predict the direction of main effects and the 
nature of selected interactions of the predictor variables in this study. Predictions 
regarding the treatment acceptability ratings were drawn from the paradoxical 
intervention literature, whereas predictions involving dissonance arousal and 
reduction are grounded in the previous discussion of dissonance theory. 
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Main Effects 
It was predicted that subjects will rate the treatment as less acceptable, will 
experience more dissonance arousal, and use more dissonance reduction 
strategies under the following conditions; 1) when the rationale is not provided 
(compared to subjects in conditions in which the rationale is provided; see Hills et 
al., 1985; Elliott, 1988; March, 1993); 2) when subjects are exposed to conditions in 
which the client is low in reactance potential (compared to subjects in conditions in 
which reactance potential is high; see Rohrbaugh, et al., 1981; Shoham-Salomon et 
al., 1989; Horvath and Goheen, 1990); and when subjects have had less exposure 
to paradoxical interventions (compared to subjects who have had more exposure to 
the use of paradoxical interventions; see Elliott, 1988). 
Interactions 
Rationale X Experience 
For subjects in conditions in which a rationale is not provided, higher levels 
of experience with paradoxical interventions were expected to be associated with 
higher ratings of treatment acceptability, lower levels of dissonance arousal, and 
less utilization of dissonance reduction strategies. This was hypothesized because 
psychologists with more experience with the theory and use of these interventions 
are expected to understand the reasons for withholding a treatment rationale from 
the client. Conversely, lower levels of experience with paradoxical interventions 
were expected to be associated with lower ratings of treatment acceptability, higher 
levels of dissonance arousal, and greater utilization of dissonance reduction 
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strategies when the rationale is absent. Persons with less experience were 
expected to rate conditions with a therapeutic rationale higher than they would for 
conditions without the rationale. These predictions were also driven by the general 
prediction that familiarity with an intervention is associated with higher ratings of 
acceptability (Elliott, 1988). 
Compared to conditions in which the rationale is present, lower levels of 
experience with paradoxical interventions were expected to be associated with even 
lower ratings of treatment acceptability, higher levels of dissonance arousal, and 
greater utilization of dissonance reduction strategies when the rationale is absent. 
When no rationale is present, subjects with more experience with paradoxical 
interventions were expected to more likely to accept the absence of the rationale 
given their understanding of the theory. As levels of experience , ethical concerns 
over the absence of a rationale were expected to lead to lower ratings of 
acceptability and higher levels of dissonance arousal and reduction. 
Reactance X Experience 
For subjects in conditions in which client reactance potential is high, higher 
levels of experience with paradoxical interventions were expected to be associated 
with higher ratings of treatment acceptability, lower levels of dissonance arousal, 
and lesser utilization of dissonance reduction strategies when compared to 
clinician's with less experience. Conversely, lower levels of experience with 
paradoxical interventions was expected to be associated with lower ratings of 
treatment acceptability, higher levels of dissonance arousal, and greater utilization 
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of dissonance reduction strategies when compared to clinician's with more 
experience. 
For subjects in conditions in which client reactance potential is low, it was 
predicted that all subjects will rate the intervention as generally low in acceptability, 
will experience dissonance arousal, and will be likely to utilize dissonance reduction 
strategies regardless of level of experience. As was mentioned previously, theory 
suggests that low reactance potential may contraindicate the use of paradoxical 
interventions. In particular, as levels of experience , the Intervention was expected 
to be seen as especially unacceptable, should arouse more dissonance, and be 
associated with greater use of reduction strategies. 
Hypotheses for Proposed Modeling Analysis 
Provided that significant relationships between predictor and criterion 
variables are identified in the regression model, the next level of analysis will test a 
proposed model in which dissonance arousal plays a partial mediational role 
between the predictor variables in the regression model (the manipulated variables 
reactance and rationale, and level of experience) and the other two criterion 
variables from the regression model (treatment acceptability and dissonance 
reduction strategies). The mediational role of dissonance was predicted to diminish 
the strength of the relationships between these two sets of variables 
Briefly, the demographic variables (age, years of experience, theoretical 
orientation, level of directiveness and spontaneity as a therapist) were expected to 
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be related to level of experience with paradoxical interventions. Specific levels of 
the manipulated variables (rationale and reactance) and the experience measure 
were expected to lead to dissonance arousal in directions consistent with those 
previously outlined in the multiple regression hypotheses. The experience measure 
was expected to interact with rationale and reactance as previously outlined. 
Higher levels of dissonance arousal were expected to lead to lower ratings of 
treatment acceptability and a lower utilization of dissonance reduction strategies. 
The proposed model is presented in Figure 2. 
Rationale 
Treatment 
Acceptability 
Reactance 
Dissonance 
Dissonance 
Reduction 
Strategies 
Experience with 
Paradoxical 
Interventions 
Age 
Yrs. Licensed 
Theoretical Orientation 
Figure 2. Hypothetical Model 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Subjects 
Six hundred licensed psychologists from Alabama, Arizona, South Dakota, 
and Oklahoma were randomly selected from lists obtained from respective state 
licensing boards. States were selected on the basis of geographic diversity and 
limited cost of obtaining address lists from state psychology license boards. An 
effort was made to randomly select a final sample which contained subjects from 
each state in proportion to their membership in the original sample (i.e., the entire 
lists of all four states). To accomplish this, the number of names from each list was 
calculated, then a random start procedure was used to determine the first 
psychologist to be included In the subject pool. Via the use of a random numbers 
table, a positive integer was chosen to count from the beginning of each state's list. 
After selecting the first subject, every nth psychologist {n = the denominator of a 
ratio representing the proportion of psychologists on a given state's list to the entire 
original sample of four lists) from the list was designated as a subject in the study. 
Informed consent was obtained via a cover letter (see Appendices A and B). 
Stimulus Materials 
A 63-item survey containing a therapy vignette, the reaction stimulus, was 
developed to measure information relevant to the variables proposed in this study. 
Four different vignette and associated survey forms were produced with identical 
content except for the manipulations of reactance (high and low conditions; 
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manipulated in the second paragraph of the vignette) and rationale (present and 
absent conditions; manipulated in the fourth paragraph in the vignette). With the 
exception of the experimental manipulations, all vignettes were identical in content 
and word length. Experimental manipulations were designed to be similar in word 
length, contrasting only in content. The four conditions presented in the vignettes 
were as follows: 1) rationale present, high client reactance potential; 2) rationale 
absent, high client reactance potential; 3) rationale present, low client reactance 
potential; and 4) rationale absent, low client reactance potential. An example 
survey from condition 1 is presented in Appendix C. The other three conditions 
were constructed by simply replacing the second and fourth paragraphs with 
appropriate text, given for each level of the manipulation as follows. 
The high reactance manipulation read as follows: "Chris expressed a high 
degree of interest in therapy, but has shown less behavioral commitment. Chris has 
arrived late to several sessions and has failed to complete mutually agreed-upon 
assigned readings and joumaling tasks. Chris's behaviors within session are 
characterized with some reluctance in terms of taking risks. Personality assessment 
results suggested low concern for making a good impression, low concern for 
following social norms, low tolerance of other's beliefs and values, and an 
inclination to express strong feelings and emotions." 
The low reactance manipulation read as follows: "Chris has maintained a 
high degree of interest in therapy throughout treatment. Chris has been responsible 
in keeping appointments and has worked diligently on mutually agreed-upon 
assigned readings and journaling tasks. Chris' behaviors within session are 
characterized with appropriate disclosure and sincere attempts at gaining insight. 
Personality assessment results suggested high concem for making a good 
impression, high concem for following social nonms, high tolerance of other's beliefs 
and values, and low inclination to express strong feelings and emotions." 
The rationale present manipulation read as follows: "In the process of 
assigning this intervention, you provide specific explanations of how you expect the 
paradoxical intervention to lead to the desired behavior change." 
The rationale absent manipulation read as follows: "In the process of 
assigning this intervention, you will not provide specific explanations of how you 
expect the paradoxical intervention to lead to the desired behavior change." 
The survey was developed utilizing the recommendations for mail survey 
research design (Weathers, Furiong, & Soloranzo, 1993; Fowler, 1993). This 
survey was developed using face-valid, theory-driven case vignettes and Likert 
scale rating items (empirically validated and face-valid items which were generated 
by the principal investigator) and demographic items. For purposes of refining 
instrument clarity and credibility, a pilot study was conducted with the participation 
of 15 staff psychologists and pre-doctoral interns at the Knoxville Department of 
Veterans Affairs Medical Center (DVAMC) in Knoxville, Iowa. Consistent with 
Medical Center policy, the pilot survey was approved by the President of American 
Federation of Government Employees Local 1226 for use with DVAMC employees. 
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Eleven staff members returned completed surveys, and they provided feedback 
regarding administration time and clinical credibility of the vignette and items 
As noted in Appendix C, the survey contained the following elements and 
was presented in sequence as follows: 1) instructions; 2) six items (items 1-6) 
which assess level of experience with paradoxical interventions; 3) the clinical 
vignette, in which the two manipulated variables (rationale and client reactance 
potential) are contained; 4) five items (items 7-11) which are manipulation checks; 
5) eleven items (items 12-22) which measure treatment acceptability (some items 
derived from Abbreviated Acceptability Rating Profile; Tamowski & Simonian, 
1992); 6) eight items (items 23-30) which measure dissonance arousal; 7) five items 
(items 31-35) which measure dissonance reduction; 8) five items (items 36-40) 
which measure treatment acceptability of symptom prescription and alternative 
intervention choices; 9) four items (items 41-44) which measure the respondents' 
perceptions of the mechanism of action of paradoxical interventions; 10) thirteen 
items (items 45-57) which measure dimensions of theoretical orientation; and 11) 
six demographic items (items 58-63). 
A response card was developed for use in this study (see Appendix D) so 
that subjects who returned the survey from the first round of mailings could return 
the postage-paid reminder card to the primary investigator. In that way, their 
participation could be identified from the return address label on the card. These 
respondents were not mailed a second, follow-up survey. However, their anonymity 
was preserved. 
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Procedure 
Prior to administering the surveys to identified subjects, human subjects 
committee approval was obtained from Iowa State University (ISU), the ISU 
Psychology Department, and the Knoxville DVAMC Research and Development 
Committee. For each potential respondent, one of four possible surveys was 
randomly chosen and mailed with a cover letter (see Appendix A), a response card 
(see Appendix D), and a stamped and addressed return envelope. Nonrespondents 
were sent a second mailing of the research materials three weeks after the first 
mailing with a different cover letter (see Appendix B). 
Design and Analyses 
As previously noted in the description of proposed hypotheses, this study 
used a two-tiered analytical strategy to determine the relationships among the 
variables of interest. Multiple regression analyses (Pedhazur, 1984; Wampold and 
Freund, 1987; Howell, 1987; Jaccard, Turrisi, & Wan, 1990; Aiken & West, 1991; 
Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) were used to determine the extent to which rationale, 
reactance, and experience with paradoxical interventions were predictive of 
treatment acceptability ratings and dissonance arousal. Dissonance reduction 
scores were analyzed using multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) procedures 
due to the low internal consistency of this construct. 
Contingent upon the significance of the regression analyses, another multiple 
regression procedure tested the proposed model of significant relationships 
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discovered in the first level of analysis. Within this model, the effects of reactance, 
rationale, and experience on treatment acceptability were expected to be mediated 
by dissonance arousal. Those subjects who experienced cognitive dissonance 
were expected to engage in dissonance reduction strategies. 
The first set of results that are presented describe the sample. Next, results 
from a constructed scale to measure the respondents' levels of experience with 
paradoxical interventions are presented in some detail, as this variable was 
expected to play an important role in the prediction of relevant criterion variables. 
The sequence of presentation of the results continues with an analysis of the 
effectiveness of experimental manipulations will be reported utilizing analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) procedures. This section is followed by a reporting of item and 
scale statistics to demonstrate the psychometric properties of four constructed 
variables in the proposed study (experience, treatment acceptability, dissonance 
arousal and dissonance reduction). These four scales were constructed to provide 
reliable measure of the constructs hypothesized to be predictor and criterion 
variables in this specific study. In view of the expected strong relationship between 
dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability, a section of the next chapter 
presents results of procedures to establish the discriminant validity of these two 
variables. 
Finally, the effects of the hypothesized predictors on the primary dependent 
measures is reported on the basis of results from several multiple regression 
procedures. A summary of results from regressing dissonance arousal and 
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treatment acceptability scores Is given first. The results from regressing dissonance 
arousal and treatment acceptability scores on hypothesized demographic predictor 
variables are reported separately. Significant main effects and Interactions are 
described. Next, the influence of the manipulated variables on dissonance 
reduction scores are tested via a multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
procedure. Lastly, the results of a post-hoc multiple regression analysis to explain 
the Interrelationships among the primary hypothesized variables is reported. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Response Rate 
A summary of response rate statistics Is presented in Table 1. A total of 147 
usable surveys were returned from the initial mailing of 600 surveys. In addition, a 
total of 61 usable surveys were returned from a follow-up mailing of 400 surveys. 
Also, a total of 16 surveys were returned to sender unopened as the addressee was 
not identifiable, and an additional 38 uncompleted surveys were returned with an 
indication from the addressee that the instrument was either not applicable to their 
role as a psychologist or that the addressee had died. Thus, a total of 208 
completed surveys were included in the study, from a total of 545 potential 
respondents, resulting in a response rate of 38.2%. 
Response rates from psychologists licensed in each of the states included in 
the study were calculated for the initial mailing of the surveys (70.1 % of the usable 
surveys). Response rates for Alabama, Arizona, Oklahoma and South Dakota were 
30.0%, 26.1%, 24.1%, and 45.0%, respectively. A chi-square test was performed 
on the responses from the initial mailing by state and it indicated that response rate 
did not differ significantly by state, (n=167, df=3)=5.25, 2>.10. Because 
response cards were not used in the follow-up mailing, response rates and a test of 
independence by state for the total set of respondents could not be determined. 
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Table 1. Response rate statistics 
n Percentage 
Usable surveys 
Returned from initial mailing (n=600) 147 
Returned from follow-up mailing (n=400) 61 
Total usable surveys 208 
Non-usable surveys 
Returned to sender, addressee unknown 16 
Instrument not applicable 38 
Addressee deceased 1 
Total non-usable surveys 55 
Total response rate (208/545) 38.2% 
Response rate by state (initial mailing only) 
Alabama 39 30.0% 
Arizona 83 26.1% 
Oklahoma 27 24.1% 
South Dakota 18 45.0% 
Response rate by condition 
Condition 1 (rationale present, high reactance) 27.9% 
Condition 2 (rationale absent, high reactance) 20.2% 
Condition 3 (rationale present, low reactance) 26.4% 
Condition 4 (rationale absent, low reactance) 25.5% 
Proportion of surveys of the total returned by condition were as follows: 
condition 1 (rationale present, high reactance) yielded 58 surveys (27.9%); 
condition 2 (rationale absent, high reactance) yielded 42 surveys (20.2%); condition 
3 (rationale present, low reactance) yielded 55 surveys (26.4%); and condition 4 
(rationale absent, low reactance) yielded 53 surveys (25.5%). A chi-square test 
was performed on the four conditions in the study, and it was noted that response 
rate did not differ significantly by condition, (n=208, df=3)=2.808, e>.10. 
Demographics 
Gender 
A summary of demographic characteristics of the respondents is presented in 
Table 2. A total of 60.1 % of the respondents were male (n=125), and 39.4% of the 
respondents were female (n=82). Respondents ranged in age from 29 to 77 years 
of age (M=48.44, SD=9.70). Two separate chi-square tests were performed to 
determine whether the gender ratio of respondents differed from the gender 
distribution of all American Psychological Association (APA) members and 
separately for therapy-related divisions. Gender ratios of APA and APA clinical and 
counseling psychology divisions were determined by utilizing demographic 
information from the 1996 APA membership directory. Expected values for gender 
ratios were considered for the overall membership of APA (54.1% male, 45.9% 
female) and by combining the memberships of Divisions 12 and 17 (clinical and 
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Table 2. Demographics 
Variable % M S.D. 
Age 
range = 29 to 77 years 
Years of postdoctoral experience 
range = 0 to 46 years 
48.44 9.70 
14.38 8.89 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
125 60.1 
82 39.4 
Degree 
Ph.D. 
Psy.D. 
Ed.D. 
M.A./M.S. 
168 80.8 
19 9.1 
17 
4 
8.2 
1.9 
Primary practice setting 
Private/group practice 88 42.3 
Other 36 17.3 
Community mental health center 18 8.7 
Private general hospital 11 5.3 
VA Medical Center 10 4.8 
Child facility 9 4.3 
Military medical center 8 3.8 
Health maintenance organization 7 3.4 
University counseling center 6 2.9 
Private psychiatric hospital 5 2.4 
Medical school 4 1.9 
Consortium 3 1.4 
State/county hospital 3 1.4 
Clientele served by respondents (percentages) 
Adult 56.99 31.00 
Adolescents 17.11 18.83 
Children 15.99 21.39 
Geriatric adult 8.12 14.56 
Individual 66.55 24.50 
Marital 12.45 14.02 
Family 12.41 16.39 
Group 6.60 12.56 
counseling, respectively; 65.2% male, 34.8% female). When using the full APA 
membership to determine expected values, it was found that the response rate did 
not differ from expectations by gender, (n=207, df=1 )=3.30, £>.05. When using 
the gender ratios of Divisions 12 and 17 to determine expected values, it was again 
found that response rate did not differ from expectations by gender, (n=207, 
df=1)=2.10,2>.10. 
Years of Experience, Degree and Setting 
Reported years of post-doctoral experience (Appendix C, item 60) ranged 
from 0 to 46 years (M=14.38, SD=8.89). A total of 1.9 % of respondents (n=4) 
indicated their highest academic degree (Appendix C, item 61) was M.A./M.S., 
80.8% of respondents (n=168) indicated their highest academic degree was Ph.D., 
8.2% of respondents (n=17) indicated their highest academic degree was Ed.D., 
and 9.1 % of respondents (n=19) indicated their highest academic degree was 
Psy.D. A total of 42.3% of respondents (n=88) reported a primary practice setting 
(Appendix C, item 62) of private or group practice, while others (57.7%, n=120) 
reported primary practice settings in places such as child facility, community mental 
health center, private general hospital, VA Medical Center, or a setting other than 
those provided in the survey. Refer to Table 2 for specific information on setting. 
Clientele Age and Treatment Context 
Respondents were asked to indicate the estimated percentage of their 
clientele by age group and treatment context (Appendix 0, item 63). Mean 
percentages were computed to determine the nature of the clientele that are treated 
by the respondents. These statistics are also summarized in Table 2. Results in 
mean percentages were as follows: children (M=15.99; SD=21.39); adolescents 
(M=17.11; SD=18.83): adult (M=56.99: SD=31.00); geriatric adult (M=8.12; 
SD=14.56); individual (M=66.55; SD=24.50): marital (M=12.45; SD=14.02): family 
(M=12.41; SD=16.39); and group (M=6.60; SD=12.56). These mean percentages of 
time reported by age group and treatment type are depicted in Figures 3 and 4, 
respectively. 
Theoretical Orientation 
A summary of statistics computed to describe the nature of respondents' 
theoretical orientations (Appendix C, items 45-50) is presented in Table 3. A rating 
scale was presented to respondents so they could indicate level of emphasis 
on a given orientation. The scale given to respondents was as follows: 1) no 
emphasis: 2) slight emphasis; 3) moderate emphasis; 4) strong emphasis; and 5) 
very strong emphasis. Mean scores of emphasis on a range of theoretical 
orientations was calculated, and are reported here in order of greatest to least 
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Table 3. Nature of respondents' clinical work 
Items M S.D. 
Theoretical Orientation 
Cognitive/rational 3.99 0.97 
Eclectic/integrative 3.89 1.13 
Behavioral 3.54 1.11 
Systemic 2.92 1.21 
Psychodynamic 2.71 1.20 
Existential 2.47 1.12 
Therapeutic behaviors 
Focusing on conscious processes 4.01 0.83 
Being active and spontaneous as a therapist 3.85 0.96 
Attending to the client's objective, observable behaviors 3.73 0.90 
Attending to my subjective, intuitive levels of experience 3.57 0.96 
Being directive as a therapist 3.17 1.01 
Focusing on unconsa'ous processes 2.93 1.13 
Maintaining personal distance from the client 2.24 0.92 
Note: The scale for the above items was as follows: 1) no emphasis; 2) slight emphasis; 3) 
moderate emphasis; 4) strong emphasis; and 5) very strong emphasis. 
emphasis: cognitive/rational (M=3.99; SD=0.97); eclectic/integratlve 
(M=3.89;SD=1.13); behavioral (M=3.54: SD=1.11); systemic (M=2.92; SD=1.21); 
psychodynamic (M=2.71; SD=1.20); and existential (M=2.47: SD=1.12). 
For Inclusion in primary analyses, this Information was converted to a 
dichotomous scale to identify those respondents that indicated very strong 
emphasis (i.e., a score of 5) on a particular theoretical orientation item. 
Respondents who indicated a score of 5 on a given item were assigned a score of 
"1," whereas those who scored less than five were assigned a score of "0" on a 
variable created to represent "primary adherents" of a given orientation 
(cognitive/rational, n = 71; behavioral, n = 45; psychodynamic n- 18; existential, n = 
7; systemic, n = 19; and eclectic/integratlve, n= 78). The numbers of respondents in 
each of these categorical indices of "primary adherents" are depicted In Figure 5. 
Therapeutic Behaviors 
Using the same anchors as just described, mean scores of emphasis on a set 
of therapeutic behaviors (Appendix C, items 51-57) were computed, and were as 
follows (see Table 3 for a summary); being directive as a therapist (M=3.17; 
SD=1.01); being active and spontaneous as a therapist (M=3.85; SD=0.96); 
maintaining personal distance from the client (M=2.24; SD=0.92); attending to the 
client's objective, observable behaviors (M=3.73; SD=0.90); attending to my 
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subjective, intuitive levels of experience (M=3.57; SD=0.96); focusing on conscious 
processes (M=4.01: SD=0.83); and focusing on unconscious processes (M=2.93; 
SD=1.13). These results are depicted graphically in Figure 6. 
Acceptability of Other Treatments 
A summary of statistics computed to describe respondents' agreement that a 
variety of treatment approaches would be acceptable for the client in the vignette 
(Appendix C, items 36-40) is presented in Table 4. The scale given to respondents 
was as follows: 1) strongly disagree; 2) moderately disagree; 3) slightly disagree; 
4) slightly agree; 5) moderately agree; and 6) strongly agree. Mean scores of 
agreement were calculated, and are reported here in order of greatest to least 
agreement: challenge cognitive distortions and irrational thinking (M=5.03; 
SD=1.19); relaxation training (M=4.84; SD=1.12); assertiveness training (M=4.30; 
SD=1.32); symptom prescription (M=3.64; SD=1.40); and analysis of transference 
and countertransference (M=2.88; SD=1.70). The results are depicted in Figure 7. 
Mechanism of Change 
Using the same rating scheme as just described, mean scores of ratings 
about the mechanism of change involved in paradoxical interventions (Appendix C, 
items 41-44) were calculated, and were as follows (see Table 4 for a summary): 
providing a novel frame of reference for the problem and its solution (M=4.53; 
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Table 4. Scores on other treatment and mechanism of change items 
Items M S.D. 
Other Treatment 
Cognitive^ 5.03 1.19 
Relaxation training^ 4.84 1.12 
Assertiveness training'^ 4.30 1.32 
Symptom prescription^ 3.64 1.40 
Psychodynamic® 2.88 1.70 
Mechanism of Change 
Novel reframe^ 4.53 1.22 
Therapeutic double bindS 4.17 1.47 
Utilize reactance'^ 3.93 1.37 
Ordeal therapy' 3.59 1.43 
Note: The scale for the above items was as follows: 1) strongly disagree; 2) moderately disagree; 3) 
slightly disagree; 4) slightly agree; 5} moderately agree; and 6) strongly agree. 
^Challenge cognitive distortions and irrational thinking. 
''Relaxation training. 
^Assertiveness training. 
^Symptom prescription. 
^Analysis of transference and countertransference. 
^Providing the client with a novel frame of reference for the problem and its solution. 
Spiacing the client in a therapeutic double bind. 
.^Capitalizing on a client's tendency to resist the influence of the therapist. 
'Creating such a therapeutic ordeal that the client begins to avoid symptomatic behaviors. 
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Figure 7. Mean scores on acceptability of other treatment items 
SD=1.22); placing the client in a therapeutic double bind (M=4.17; SD=1.47); 
capitalizing on the client's tendency to resist the influence of the therapist (M=3.93; 
SD=1.37): and creating such a therapeutic ordeal that the client begins to avoid 
symptomatic behaviors (M=3.59; SD=1.43). These results are depicted graphically 
in Figure 8. 
Respondents' Levels of Experience With Paradoxical Interventions 
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or 
disagreement with six statements about their experience with paradoxical 
interventions (Appendix C, items 1-6). Results are reported in terms of mean raw 
scores, standard deviations, and percent of respondents who indicated particular 
raw scores on the given scale. Some of these percent scores are reported below in 
narrative fashion to offer some practical indication of the meaning of the raw scores. 
The overall experience score is discussed within the next section as a part of 
validation of multi-item scales for use in later analyses. 
The first item, "I have used paradoxical Interventions in my practice," yielded 
a mean score that indicated slight agreement (M=4.0: SD=1.66). This was also the 
median and modal response. Although 73.4% (n=149) of respondents indicated at 
least slight agreement with this item, 14.4 % (n=30) reported strong disagreement. 
The second item, "I have received training and supervision in the therapeutic 
use of paradoxical interventions," yielded a mean score that approached slight 
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agreement (M=3.9: SD=1.73). The median and modal response indicated slight 
agreement. While 70.0% (n=142) of respondents indicated at least slight 
agreement with this Item, 18.2 % (n=37) reported strong disagreement. 
The third item, "Paradoxical interventions conflict with principles of Informed 
consent," yielded a mean score that indicated slight to moderate disagreement 
(M=2.72; SD=1.34). The item was reverse scored for inclusion in the variable that 
measured overall level of experience. These results are reported after scores were 
reversed in order to maintain consistency with the other five Items In the scale. The 
median response Indicated slight disagreement, and the modal response Indicated 
moderate disagreement. Although 72.1% (n=145) of respondents indicated at least 
slight disagreement with this item, 27.9% (n=56) of respondents Indicated at least a 
slight level of agreement. 
The fourth item, "Paradoxical interventions can be effective treatment 
strategies," yielded a mean score that approached moderate agreement (M=4.94; 
SD=1.01). The median and modal response indicated moderate agreement. While 
93.1 % (n=188) of respondents indicated at least slight agreement with this item, 
6.9% (n=14) reported some level of disagreement. 
The fifth Item, 'The use of paradoxical interventions requires extensive 
training and supervision," yielded a mean score between slight and moderate 
agreement (M=4.40; SD=1.27). The median and modal response indicated 
moderate agreement. While 79.2% (n=160) of respondents indicated some level of 
agreement with this Item, 20.8% (n=42) reported some level of disagreement. 
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The sixth item, "Paradoxical interventions are ethically sound treatment 
strategies," yielded a mean score between slight and moderate agreement (M=4.46; 
SD=1.10). The median and modal response indicated moderate agreement. While 
86.1% (n=173) of respondents indicated at least slight agreement with this item, 
13.9% (n=28) reported some level of disagreement. 
In summary, respondents reporting of their levels of experience with 
paradoxical interventions suggested that most respondents have received 
supervision and training in using paradoxical interventions, have used these 
techniques in their own practice, and believe that the interventions can be effective 
treatment strategies. Most respondents indicated that using these procedures 
requires extensive training and supervision, and that the interventions are ethically 
sound and do not conflict with principles of informed consent. 
Manipulation Checks 
The two experimental manipulations in this study were the level of reactance 
(high or low) presented on the part of the client in the vignette, and whether or not a 
therapeutic rationale is to be given to the proposed client. The effectiveness of the 
manipulations provided in the case vignette were tested by performing 2X2 
(reactance X rationale) analyses of variance (ANOVA) on each of the items 
(Appendix C, items 7-8) that measured the manipulations. Manipulations were 
deemed successful if main effects for a factor are found in the ANOVA for it's 
respective item in the absence of an main effect for the other factor and the 
absence of a significant interaction effect. 
Three additional items (Appendix C, items 9-11) were administered to 
determine the clinical relevance and credibility of the vignette; results of these items 
are also reported. All three of the items were rated on the following scale: 1) 
strongly disagree; 2) moderately disagree; 3) slightly disagree; 4) slightly agree; 5) 
moderately agree; and 6) strongly agree. 
Experimental Manipulations 
Respondents' perceptions of the level of psychological reactance on the part 
of the client in the vignette was measured with the item, "Chris appears to be 
resisting my interpersonal influence as a therapist." The 2X2 ANOVA for this item 
yielded a main effect for reactance, F(1,200)=125.87,2<.05, and an effect size 
which indicated that the main effect of reactance accounted for 39.2% of the 
variance in scores on this item (eta = .626). Neither the main effect for rationale, 
F(1,200)=0.21, £(>.10, nor the rationale X reactance interaction effect, 
F(1,200)=0.75, E>.10, were significant. Respondents in the low reactance group 
reported moderate to strong disagreement with this statement (M=1.60, SD=1.03; 
n=105), whereas respondents in the high reactance group reported slight 
agreement to slight disagreement with the item. The manipulation appears to have 
been effective with regard to portraying a client low in psychological reactance. 
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However, the portrayal of a client high in reactance appears to have been 
perceived ambiguously. Though significantly different from their counterparts in the 
low reactance conditions, respondents in the high reactance conditions do not 
report a level of agreement satisfactory to conclude that the manipulation of client 
reactance level was entirely successful. Certainly, this is anticipated to have 
implications for subsequent analyses including reactance as a variable of interest. 
Respondents' understanding of the instruction regarding whether or not the 
client in the vignette was given a rationale for the paradoxical interventions was 
measured with the item, "Chris was given the rationale for this intervention." The 
2X2 ANOVA for this item yielded a main effect for rationale F(1,202)=213.58, 2<-05, 
and an effect size which indicated that the manipulation of rationale accounted for 
51.8% of the variance in scores on this item (eta = .720). Neither the main effect for 
reactance, F(1,202)=0.90, fi>.10, nor the rationale X reactance interaction effect, 
F(1,202)=0.99, E>.10, were significant. Respondents in conditions with the 
rationale absent reported moderate to strong disagreement with the item (M=1.77, 
SD=1.14), whereas respondents in conditions with the rationale present reported 
slight to moderate agreement with the item (M=4.49, SD=1.43). The effect of the 
rationale manipulation was most successful in indicating absence of rationale, and 
less successful (though considered adequate for purposes of this study) in terms of 
indicating presence of a therapeutic rationale. 
Clinical Credibility 
Three items measured the clinical credibility of the vignette (Appendix 0, 
items 9-11). For each item, results are first presented for the entire group of 
respondents. Then, results are given for 2X2 ANOVAs performed on each of these 
three items with reactance and rationale as factors. 
The first item, "Chris's problem and behaviors are generally similar to those 
presented by clients In my clinical practice" was presumed to be the most rigorous 
test of relevance given the requirement of a general correspondence between the 
vignette and the practice of the respondent. Results showed that the average 
respondent found slight agreement (M=4.00; SD=1.46) with this item; the median 
response indicated slight agreement, and the modal response moderate agreement. 
72.3% (n=146) of respondents indicated some level of agreement, while 27.7% 
(n=56) indicated some level of disagreement. 
The results of the first item regarding similarity of the vignette to one's own 
clinical practice might be interpreted with consideration given to previously reported 
results on the nature of respondents' practice characteristics. The vignette 
portrayed a psychologist working with an individual client with anxiety associated 
with work-related responsibilities. On average, respondents indicated spending 
66.55% of their time with individuals, and 82.22% of their time with persons who 
could conservatively be conceived to be of working age (56.99% of their time with 
adults; 17.11% with adolescents; 8.12% with geriatric adults). These estimations 
give some insight Into the nature of the respondents' comparisons between the 
vignette and their own practice. One would not expect the results of first of these 
three manipulation check items about similarity to substantially exceed the 
estimations from clinical practice. 
The 2X2 ANOVA for this item yielded a significant main effect for reactance 
F(1,201)=5.91, p<.05, eta = .18 (accounting for 3.1% of the variation in scores on 
this item). Though both groups indicate some level of agreement with regard to 
similarity, respondents in conditions with a low reactance client indicated that the 
client in the vignette (M=4.25, SD=1.41) was more similar to clients in their own 
clinical practices than did respondents in conditions with a high reactance client in 
the vignette (M=3.73, SD=1.48). There were no other significant main effects or 
interactions for this item. 
The second of three items regarding clinical credibility stated "I am 
comfortable working with Chris." Results showed that the average respondent 
found moderate agreement with this statement (M=5.09: SD=1.06): the median and 
modal responses also showed moderate agreement. Nearly 83% (n=170) reported 
moderate to strong agreement with this item, whereas 7.8% (n=16) reported some 
level of disagreement. 
The 2X2 ANOVA for this item yielded a significant main effect for reactance 
F(1,205)=12.93, p<.05, eta = .24 (accounting for 5.7% of the variation in scores on 
this item). Though both groups indicated some level of agreement with regard to 
comfort level working with the client in the vignette, respondents in conditions with a 
low reactance client indicated more comfort working with the client in the vignette 
(M=5.33, SD=0.98) than did respondents in conditions with a high reactance client 
in the vignette (M=4.83, SD=1.09). There were no other significant main effects or 
interactions for this item. 
The third of these items regarding clinical credibility stated "I am able to 
imagine myself in this psychologist role." Results showed that the average 
respondent approached moderate agreement with this statement (M=4.91; 
SD=1.35); the median response showed moderate agreement, while the modal 
response showed strong agreement. 77.2% (n=159) reported moderate to strong 
agreement with this item, whereas 14.1% (n=29) reported some level of 
disagreement. 
The 2X2 ANOVAfor this item yielded no significant main effects. The 
interaction term, however, was significant, F(1,205)=7.87, p<.01, eta = .19 
(accounting for 3.7% of the total variance in scores on this item). The pattern of the 
means indicated that in conditions in which a rationale was not given, respondents 
were better able to imagine themselves in the psychologist role when the client was 
high in reactance than in cases in which the client was low in reactance. The 
reverse was true when a rationale was present, such that respondents in conditions 
in which the client was low in reactance were more able to imagine themselves in 
the psychologist role than were those in conditions in which the client was high in 
reactance. 
A one-way ANOVA with was conducted to further explain the nature of the 
simple effects of the independent variables on this manipulation check item. The 
overall model Indicated significant differences between the four conditions, F 
(3,205)=3.93, p<.05. Post hoc comparisons using a least significant difference test 
(LSD) procedure to identify differences between groups with an alpha level set at 
.05. These comparisons yielded the finding that condition 3 (rationale present, low 
reactance; M=5.40, S=0.81) differed significantly from condition 1 (rationale 
present, high reactance; M=4.63, SD=1.46) and condition 4 (rationale absent, low 
reactance; M=4.68, SD=1.66), and that no group differed significantly from condition 
2 (rationale absent, high reactance; M=4.95, SD=1.16). There were no other 
significant differences among the means. 
Summary 
The experimental manipulations were shown to generally be effective, 
although with some limitations. Presence or absence of rationale was determined 
to be successfully manipulated, although the effect was stronger for conditions in 
which the rationale was absent than for conditions in which the rationale was 
present. This finding might be due to variability in respondents' definitions of what 
constitutes the provision of a rationale for a paradoxical intervention. Respondents 
with varying training and clinical experiences may very well provide different type of 
rationale to clients. 
The manipulation of high or low psychological reactance on the part of the 
proposed client was quite effective for the low reactance condition, and quite 
ambiguous for conditions in which reactance levels were intended to be perceived 
as high. Even though the difference between the two levels of reactance were 
statistically significant, the actual level of agreement that the proposed highly 
reactant client was perceived to be resisting the therapist's interpersonal influence 
was too low to be considered a successful manipulation of high reactance. 
In terms of clinical credibility, respondents reported acceptable levels of: 1) 
agreement that the client's problem and behaviors were generally similar to those 
presented by clients in their own practices; 2) comfort in working with the client in 
the vignette; and 3) ability to imagine themselves in the analogue psychologist role. 
Perceived similarity to current practice and overall level of comfort were greater for 
respondents in low reactance conditions than was the case for respondents in high 
reactance conditions. Although these findings may lend some support for the 
effectiveness of the reactance manipulation, they do not indicate enough support to 
warrant strong conclusions about clinician's practices with clients who are perceived 
to be high in reactance. Further, respondents in rationale absent conditions were 
better able to imagine the analogue role when the client was high in reactance 
(rather than low in reactance), and respondents in rationale present conditions were 
better able to imagine the analogue role when the client was low in reactance 
(rather than high in reactance). 
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Instrument Development 
Reliabilities of Constmcted Variables 
Four sets of multiple-item measures were constructed for use in this study. 
Scales with items specific to the stimulus were desirable in order to maximize the 
relevance of items to the case vignette. Cronbach's alpha coefficients were 
computed as measures of the internal consistencies of the proposed scales. When 
appropriate, items were deleted to Improve the psychometric properties of the 
scales. All scale modifications were performed prior to using the scales as 
variables in subsequent analyses. Predetermined criteria for coefficient alpha and 
item-total correlations were set to be greater than or equal to 0.75 and 0.30, 
respectively (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994; Howell, 1987). 
Experience 
Six items (Appendix C, items 1-6) were generated to measure the extent of 
experience that respondents had with paradoxical interventions. Three of these five 
items (Appendix C, first page, items 3, 4 and 6) appear to also measure 
respondents' attitudes toward paradoxical interventions. The item, 'The use of 
paradoxical interventions requires extensive training and supervision" was found to 
have a low corrected item-total correlation (.07) and was excluded from the scale. 
The resulting five item measure of clinician experience had a coefficient alpha of 
0.80. The average inter-item correlation for this scale was .49. Item statistics for 
this scale are reported in Table 5. 
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Table 5. item and scale statistics for experience scale 
Corrected Alpha 
item-total if item 
Item M S.D. correlation deleted Alpha 
1) Have used® 4.03 1.64 .65 .65 
2) Received training'' 3.92 1.72 .54 .69 
3) Informed consent®'*" 4.28 1.34 .55 .69 
4) Can be effective'^ 4.96 0.98 .57 .70 
5) Requires trainino® 4.42 1.25 .07 .80* 
6) Ethically sound^ 4.46 1.10 .63 .68 
Total 21.65 5.18 
Notes: The scale for the above items was as follows: 1) strongly disagree; 2) moderately disagree; 
3) slightly disagree; 4) slightly agree; 5) moderately agree; and 6) strongly agree. Totals provide 
scale statistics subsequent to deletions. 
^Denotes reverse scored item. 
^Denotes deleted item. 
^ I have used paradoxical interventions in my practice. 
^ I have received training and supervision in the therapeutic use of paradoxical interventions. 
^ Paradoxical interventions conflict with principles of informed consent. 
^ Paradoxical interventions can be effective treatment strategies. 
® The use of paradoxical interventions requires extensive training and supervision. 
^ Paradoxical interventions are ethically sound treatment strategies. 
Treatment Acceptability 
Eleven items (Appendix C, items 12-22) were written to measure the extent to 
which respondents believed the paradoxical intervention administered in the 
vignette was an acceptable form of treatment. One item, "Overall, this form of 
treatment will be helpful," was found to have a negative (though strong) relationship 
to the other items (-.90) and was therefore excluded from the scale. Another item, "I 
provide only those treatments that have been empirically validated," was found to 
have a negative and weak relationship (-.16). The resulting nine item measure of 
treatment acceptability had a coefficient alpha of .95. The average inter-item 
correlation for this scale was .68. Item statistics for this scale are reported in Table 
6. 
Dissonance Arousal 
Eight items (Appendix C, items 23-30) were written to measure the extent to 
which respondents felt a level of emotional arousal that could be attributed to 
cognitive dissonance. No items were deleted from the scale on the basis of 
corrected item-total correlations. The resulting eight item measure of dissonance 
arousal had a coefficient alpha of 0.91. The average inter-item correlation for this 
scale was .56. Item statistics for this scale are reported in Table 7. 
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Table 6. Item and scale statistics for treatment acceptability scale 
Item 
Corrected Alpha 
item-total if item 
M S.D. correlation deleted 
3.82 1.49 .84 .78 
3.58 1.30 .84 .79 
3.64 1.46 .86 .78 
3.81 1.61 .77 .79 
4.09 1.26 .68 .80 
3.67 1.34 .85 .78 
3.31 1.31 -0.89 .91* 
3.51 1.37 .83 .79 
4.44 1.23 .66 .80 
3.83 1.36 .69 .80 
3.44 1.40 -0.16 .87* 
41.05 9.14 
Aloha 
1} Acceptable choice^ 
2) Should be effective^ 
3) Severe enough® 
4) Willing to use^ 
5) Bad side effects® 
6) Expect positive results^ 
7) Helpful' 
8) Appropriate'' 
9) Consider again' 
10) Benefits vs. Risksi-'" 
11) Empirically validated*^ 
Total .95 
Notes: The scale for the above items was as follows: 1) strongly disagree; 2) moderately disagree; 
3) slightly disagree; 4) slightly agree; 5) moderately agree; and 6) strongly agree. Totals provide 
scale statistics subsequent to deletions. 
'Denotes reverse scored item. 
^Denotes deleted item 
This is an acceptable choice of intervention for this case. 
The treatment should be effective in changing Chris's symptoms. 
Chris's symptoms are severe enough to justify the use of this intervention. 
I would be willing to use this treatment with one of my own clients. 
This intervention is likely to have bad side effects for Chris. 
I expect positive results from this particular intervention. 
Overall, this form of treatment will be helpful. 
I am confident that a paradoxical intervention would be appropriate with Chris. 
I Given a successful outcome, I would consider using symptom prescription again in the future, 
j The potential benefits of using a paradoxical intervention outweigh the potential risks. 
I provide only those treatments that have been empirically validated. 
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Table 7. Item and scale statistics for dissonance arousal scale 
Corrected Alpha 
item-total if item 
Item M S.D. correlation deleted 
1) Regret® 2.88 1.44 .77 .89 
2) Guilty'' 2.36 1.27 .70 .90 
3) Deceived'^ 2.52 1.49 .68 .90 
4) Tension^ 2.84 1.43 .71 .90 
5) Uncomfortable® 2.75 1.48 .81 .89 
6) Manipulative^ 2.35 1.37 .78 .89 
7) No apprehension^'^ 3.72 1.49 .61 .91 
8) Comfortable^'*" 2.89 1.48 .63 .91 
Total 22.30 8.98 
Note: The scale for the above items was as follows: 1) strongly disagree; 2) moderately disagree; 3) 
slightly disagree; 4) slightly agree; 5) moderately agree; and 6) strongly agree. 
'Denotes reverse scored item. 
^ I regret taking the risk of providing this intervention. 
^ i feel guilty about prescribing Chris's symptoms. 
^ I have deceived Chris with my choice of intervention. 
^ i feel tension after prescribing a paradoxical intervention with Chris. 
^ I am uncomfortable about the potential damage that may be done to my relationship with Chris. 
^ I have been unjustifiably manipulative toward Chris. 
9 I have no apprehension about administering a paradoxical intervention with Chris. 
^ I will be comfortable sharing this intervention choice with my colleagues. 
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Dissonance Reduction 
Five items (Appendix C, items 31-35) were generated to measure the extent 
to which respondents were motivated to reduce the level of cognitive dissonance. 
The proposed five item measure of dissonance reduction had a coefficient alpha of 
0.17, indicating a scale quite diverse in content. Corrected item-total correlations 
for all five items ranged from -.04 to .15. With such diversity of item content, this 
scale would not be used as a variable that could yield interpretable results. Thus, 
the decision was made to use each dissonance reduction item as a separate 
dependent measure in the study. The average inter-item correlation for this scale 
was .05. Item statistics for this scale are reported in Table 8. 
Discriminating Between Treatment Acceptability and Dissonance Arousal 
The scales for dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability (Appendix C, 
items 23-30 and 12-22, respectively) were submitted to statistical tests to determine 
if their content was sufficiently different to warrant their inclusion as two distinct 
constructs in this study. Three procedures were conducted to address this issue: 
1) calculation of the correlation between the two multi-item scales; 2) two 
confirmatory factor analyses (both one factor and two factor solutions were 
generated), and 3) scale statistics to determine the corrected item-total correlations 
and change in alpha as each item from one of the two scales was included in the 
scale of the counterpart scale (e.g., one treatment acceptability item at a time was 
included in the scale for dissonance arousal and vice versa). 
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Table 8. Item and scale statistics for dissonance reduction scale 
Corrected Alpha 
item-total if item 
Item M S.D. correlation deleted 
1) Not demonstrated® 3.34 1.47 .12 .09 
2) Managed care^ 3.48 1.71 -0.04 .28 
3) Not responsible'^ 2.17 1.17 .15 .07 
4) Patient compliance^ 2.67 1.27 .12 .09 
5) Ethical concerns^ 3.01 1.44 .05 .16 
Total 14.67 3.42 
Note: The scale for the above items was as follows: 1) strongly disagree; 2) moderately disagree; 3) 
slightly disagree; 4) slightly agree; 5) nnoderately agree; and 6) strongly agree. 
^ I am concerned that the clinical utility of paradoxical interventions has not been sufficiently 
demonstrated. 
The influence of managed care in psychotherapy encourages the use of provocative 
interventions. 
^ I am not personally responsible for any manipulation that Chris may perceive. 
The outcome of the symptom prescription is attributable to Chris's compliance, not my own lack 
of skill. 
^ My ethical concerns about paradoxical interventions make this a poor choice for this client. 
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First, the correlation between dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability 
was calculated, r = .-75. Note that the internal consistencies of each of the two 
scales had previously been established as very high. Cronbach's coefficient alphas 
for dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability were calculated to be .91 and 
.95, respectively. This implies that there was some unique variation in these two 
scales. 
Next, two confirmatory factor analyses were performed on the 17 items 
comprising the two scales for dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability. 
These procedures were conducted to test the hypothesis that a two-factor model 
provided a better fit to the data than a one-factor model. Results from these 
procedures are summarized in Tables 9 and 10 (representing results from one and 
two factor maximum likelihood solutions, respectively). Chi-square statistics and 
goodness of fit indices are reported for each model. 
Examination of the correlations of each of the 17 items with a derived single 
factor (labeled as "factor loadings" in Table 9) shows that all the correlations were 
strong (e.g., minimum value = -.558). Examination of these correlations also 
suggests an overall stronger pattern of relationships for the group of treatment 
acceptability than is observed for the group of arousal items. Looking at the 
correlations reported for the two-factor solution (Table 10) reveals that the 
coefficients tended to be slightly higher with the use of this model when compared 
with the one factor model. This increase in correlations is more evident for the eight 
dissonance arousal items. 
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Table 9. Summary of confirmatory factor analysis results: One factor model 
Factor Loadings for Standardized Solution 
Variable Factor 1 
Treati .875 
Treat2 .864 
Treats .879 
Treat4 .811 
Treats .743 
Treats .894 
Treats .881 
Treat9 .697 
Treati 0 .711 
Arousel -0.797 
Arouse2 -0.595 
Arouses -0.558 
Arouse4 -0.595 
ArouseS -0.707 
Arouse6 -0.664 
Arouse? -0.658 
Arouses -0.690 
Goodness of Fit Sumnnarv 
Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square (X^. n=195, d^119) = 406.82 (e<0.05) 
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index 0.808 
Bentier-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index 0.819 
Comparative Fit Index (CFl) 0.841 
Robust Comparative Fit Index 0.851 
Note: All factor loadings were statistically significant (2<.05). 
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Table 10. Summary of confirmatory factor analysis results; Two factor model 
Factor Loadinos for Standardized Solution 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Treati .901 
Treat2 .889 
Treats .893 
Treat4 .802 
Treats .739 
Treats .909 
Treats .884 
Treat9 .691 
Treati 0 .699 
Arousel .825 
Arouse2 .730 
Arouse3 .711 
Arouse4 .737 
Arouses .849 
Arouse6 .807 
Arouse? .647 
Arouses .667 
'"(FrF2) ~ 
Goodness of Fit Summary 
Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square (X^- n=195, d^118) = 252.65 (£<0.05) 
Bentler-Bonett Ncmfied Fit Index 0.883 
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index 0.908 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.920 
Robust Comparative Fit Index 0.930 
Note: All factor loadings were statistically significant (2<-05). 
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Chi-square statistics were computed to evaluate wtiether or not these factor 
models could account for the relationships among the items. The one factor model 
was found to be statistically significant, (n=195, df=119)=406.82, £>.05. The two 
factor model was also statistically significant, (n=195, df=118)=252.65, £>.05 . 
The difference between these two chi-square statistics is Itself distributed as 
a chi-square. Thus, one can subtract the two-factor solution chi-square from the 
one-factor solution chi-square to determine whether the two models differ by more 
than would be expected by chance. The difference between the chi-square 
statistics for the one factor and two factor models was highly significant, X^ {n=195, 
df=1 )=154.17, £>.05. This result suggests that the two factor model provided a 
better fit to the data than the one factor model. The correlation between the two 
factors in the two factor model was -.80, indicating that 64% of the variance in 
scores on these items can be explained with these two factors. The amount of 
unique variance in the factors (36%) suggests that treatment acceptability and 
dissonance arousal are related but distinct constructs. 
As a third method to assess the distinctiveness of the two scales, items from 
one of the two scales were included in the composition of the other scale, then 
scale statistics were generated to determine the corrected item-total correlation of 
one item within the context of all of its counterparts. For example, one dissonance 
arousal item was included in the treatment acceptability scale. Then, scale 
statistics were computed to examine the change in internal consistency that occurs 
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when one Item from a given scale is included in the composition of the other scale. 
These data are summarized in Table 11. 
In general, the results indicate that the individual dissonance arousal items 
are correlated in a moderate to strong negative manner with the overall treatment 
acceptability scale. However, the inclusion of the dissonance arousal items in the 
treatment acceptability scale tended to the internal consistency of the scale in 
terms of alpha level from .05 to .08. With regard to the other scale, individual 
treatment acceptability items were correlated in a moderate to strong negative 
manner with the overall dissonance arousal scale. However, inclusion of 
dissonance arousal items in the treatment acceptability scale tended to the internal 
consistency of the scale in terms of alpha by .08 to .12. These data suggest that 
items from one of these scales detract from the effort to create homogenous scales 
when included in the composition of the other scale. The small variation in the 
change in the alpha statistics for both scales is reflective of the very high internal 
consistency of the constructed scales. 
In summary, these results provide evidence to support the conclusion that 
while dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability are related, the constructs 
have adequate discriminant validity to allow for inclusion in this study as distinct 
dependent variables. Further evidence for discriminant validity may be provided 
when experimental manipulations are tested for effects on the two dependent 
variables of dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability. The extent to which 
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Table 11. Item and scale statistics for inclusion of TA and DA items in counterpart 
scales^ 
Corrected item- Corrected item- Change in alpha 
total correlation total correlation if item included in; 
Item with TA scale with DA scale TA DA 
Arousel -0.75 .77 -0.08 — 
Arouse2 -0.52 .70 -0.05 — 
Arouses -0.49 .68 -0.06 — 
Arouse4 -0.52 .72 -0.06 — 
ArouseS -0.64 .81 -0.07 — 
Arouse6 -0.60 .78 -0.06 — 
Arouse? -0.62 .61 -0.07 — 
ArouseS -0.67 .63 -0.07 — 
Treati .84 -0.63 -0.10 
Treat2 .S4 -0.62 — -0.09 
Treats .S6 -0.68 — -0.10 
Treat4 .76 -0.67 — -0.12 
Treats .68 -0.62 — -0.08 
Treats .85 -0.69 — -0.10 
Treats .83 -0.71 — -0.10 
Treat9 .66 -0.59 — -0.08 
Treati 0 .69 -0.61 — -0.09 
®TA=Treatment Acceptability, DA=Dissonance Arousal. 
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different patterns of results emerge when using the same predictor variables may 
provide additional evidence to address this particular issue of discriminant validity. 
Primary Analyses 
The Effects of Manipulated Variables on Dependent Measures 
Multiple regression procedures were conducted to determine the effects of 
the demographic and manipulated variables on the criterion variables dissonance 
arousal and treatment acceptability. For purposes of analysis and determining 
significance of effect, standardized scores were calculated for predictor variables to 
reduce potential multicollinearity. To assist in the interpretive process, a master 
table of means and standard deviations of scores on major variables of Interest, 
reported by condition, was generated (Appendix E). 
The results of the regression of dissonance arousal and treatment 
acceptability scores on hypothesized predictors among the demographic variables 
are summarized in Table 12. None of these demographic variables were significant 
In terms of ability to predict scores on dissonance arousal or on treatment 
acceptability. Thus, none of the demographic variables were included in 
subsequent analyses. 
The constructed variable paradoxical treatment experience and the four 
experimental conditions (manipulations of the two levels of rationale and reactance) 
comprised the first block of variables entered In the analyses, the two-way 
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Table 12. Summary of regression analysis for hypothesized demographic 
variables predicting dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability 
scores 
Dissonance Arousal 
Variable B SE B Beta t 
Age .03 .07 .04 .48 
Degree .47 1.70 .02 .28 
Gender -0.53 1.45 -0.03 -0.36 
Directive .30 .76 .03 .36 
Active/spontaneous -0.50 .77 -0.05 -0.65 
Cognitive -1.67 1.58 -0.09 -1.05 
Behavioral -0.09 1.81 -0.01 -0.05 
Systemic -2.95 2.27 -0.10 -1.30 
Eclectic/integrative -1.25 1.37 -0.07 -0.91 
Treatment Acceotabilitv 
Variable B SEB Beta t 
Age .01 .08 .01 .14 
Degree .06 1.90 .00 .03 
Gender .47 1.62 .02 .29 
Directive -1.01 .84 -0.10 -1.20 
Active/spontaneous .89 .86 .09 1.04 
Cognitive .55 1.77 .03 .31 
Behavioral 1.70 2.02 .07 .84 
Systemic -0.35 2.54 -0.01 -0.14 
Eclectic/integrative .97 1.53 .05 .63 
Note: For Dissonance Arousal, overall F (9,191)=0.42, for Treatment Acceptability, overall 
F(9,190)=0.55,fi>.10. 
•Denotes e<.05 
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interaction terms of the three variables from the first step comprised the second 
block, and the three-way interaction among the three variables In the first step was 
entered as the third and final step. The results of these analyses are summarized 
for dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability scores in Tables 13 and 14, 
respectively. 
Dissonance Arousal 
With regard to the regression analysis on dissonance arousal scores, the 
first step in the regression procedure was significant (see Table 13), Indicating that 
the effects of experience, rationale and reactance accounted for 24% of the 
variance in dissonance arousal scores. The main effect for experience was 
significant and Indicated that higher levels of experience with paradoxical 
Interventions were associated with lower levels of dissonance arousal. No 
significant main effects were found for rationale or reactance. 
The rationale X experience interaction was significant (see Table 13). The 
results suggest that when the rationale was absent, a stronger association of higher 
levels of experience and lower levels of arousal is evident than when the rationale 
was present. Clinicians with the most experience with paradoxical Interventions 
reported lower levels of dissonance arousal when the rationale was absent than 
when it was present. Clinicians with relatively less experience with paradoxical 
interventions reported lower levels of dissonance arousal when the rationale was 
present than when it was absent. This interaction is depicted in Figure 9. 
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Table 13. Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting 
dissonance arousal scores 
Variable B SEB Beta t R2 change® 
Step 1 
Experience 
Rationale 
Reactance 
-4.28 
-0.88 
.35 
.57 
.57 
.57 
-0.47 
-0.10 
.04 
-7.53' 
-1.55 
.61 
.24' 
Step 2 
Rat X Exp 
React X Exp 
Rat X React 
1.56 
-0.45 
.98 
.59 
.58 
.57 
.17 
-0.05 
.11 
2.64' 
-0.78 
1.72 
.03 
Step 3 
Rat X React X Exp -1.27 .58 -0.14 -2.19* 
.02 
"Denotes 2<.05. 
values for the full model for each step were as follows; Step 1, F(3.199)=20.59*: Step 2, 
F (6,199)=12.10*; and Step 3, F(7.199)=11.26'. 
Table 14. Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting 
treatment acceptability scores 
R2 change^ 
Step1 .10* 
Variable B SEB Beta t 
Experience 3.32 .70 .32 4.73' 
Rationale .50 .70 .05 .71 
Reactance .21 .70 .02 .30 
Rat X Exp -1.56 .73 -0.15 -2.15' 
React X Exp 1.59 .72 .15 2.22' 
Rat X React -0.95 .70 -0.09 -1.35 
Rat X React X Exp 1.34 .72 .13 1.85 
Step 2 .04 
Step 3 .01 
'Denotes e<.05. 
®F values for the full model for each step were as follows: Step 1, F(3,199)=7.67*: Step 2, 
F (6,199)=5.43'; and Step 3, F(7,199)=5.20*. 
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Figure 9. Rationale X experience interaction effect on 
dissonance arousal scores 
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All figures that report interaction effects were constructed using data from the 
respective regression equations. All significant interactions involved the 
constructed variable experience. The x-axis on figures represents scores on the 
experience scale. Representations of regression lines were constructed by using 
the intercept term for each model (which was plotted on the y-axis and indicates the 
value of the criterion variable when experience is assumed to be zero) and a 
maximum value for the experience variable (calculated algebraically by using the 
maximum raw value of the experience variable in the regression equation). 
The three-way interaction between experience, rationale and reactance was 
also significant. This interaction is depicted graphically in Figure 10 (in which 
dissonance arousal x experience regression lines are plotted for each of the four 
experimental conditions). Examination of these regression lines suggests that the 
manipulation of rationale had little differential effect for respondents in conditions 
with highly reactant clients (conditions 1 and 2). In these two conditions the 
relationship between experience and dissonance arousal appears to be consistent 
with the previously described effects. However, the presence or absence of a 
rationale did discriminate between respondents in conditions with low levels of 
reactance (conditions 3 and 4). When the rationale was present (condition 3), the 
inverse relationship between experience and dissonance arousal diminished 
compared to what was observed in high reactance conditions. Conversely, the 
strength of this inverse relationship between experience and dissonance arousal 
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was greater when the rationale was absent in low reactant client condition 
(condition 4). In condition 4, less experience with paradoxical interventions was 
associated with higher levels of arousal, while more experience was associated with 
lower levels of arousal. 
In summary, the main effect of higher levels of experience being associated 
with lower levels of arousal was generally evident (with the exception of condition 
3). However, a contrasted effect appeared between the two different rationale 
conditions with low reactant clients. The main effect diminished for the rationale 
present condition (experience levels had minimal effect on arousal levels), and that 
the effect was stronger for rationale absent conditions (experience levels were 
strongly related to lower levels of dissonance arousal). 
Treatment Acceptabilitv 
In terms of the regression of treatment acceptability scores (see Table 14), 
the first step was again determined to be significant in that the effects of experience, 
rationale and reactance accounted for 10% of the variance in treatment 
acceptability scores. Once again, only the main effect for experience was 
significant, indicating that higher levels of experience with paradoxical interventions 
was associated with higher ratings of treatment acceptability. There were no main 
effects for rationale or reactance. 
Two of the three two-way interactions were significant (see Table 14). The 
results for the rationale X experience effect suggest that when the rationale was 
absent, a stronger association of higher levels of experience and higher levels of 
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treatment acceptability was evident than when the rationale was present. Clinicians 
with the most experience with paradoxical interventions reported higher levels of 
treatment acceptability when the rationale was absent than when it was present. 
Clinicians with relatively less experience with paradoxical interventions reported 
higher levels of treatment acceptability when the rationale was present than when it 
was absent. This Interaction Is graphically depicted In Figure 11. 
The reactance X experience interaction was also significant (see Table 14). 
These results suggest that when the client was high in reactance, a stronger 
association of higher levels of experience and higher levels of treatment 
acceptability was evident than when the client was low in reactance. Clinicians with 
the most experience with paradoxical interventions reported higher levels of 
treatment acceptability when the client was high in reactance than when the client 
was low in reactance. Clinicians with relatively less experience with paradoxical 
interventions reported higher levels of treatment acceptability when the client was 
low in reactance than when the client was high in reactance. This interaction is 
depicted in Figure 12. There was no significant three-way interaction for scores on 
treatment acceptability. 
Dissonance Reduction 
The influence of the manipulated variables on dissonance reduction scores 
was evaluated with a 2X2 multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) procedure. This 
procedure was chosen as a more stringent test of possible main effects or 
interactions among the dissonance reduction items which did not have sufficient 
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115 
internal consistency to wan'ant analysis as a scale. The results of this procedure 
are summarized in Table 15. The only multivariate effect that was statistically 
significant the main effect for reactance. Respondents endorsed stronger levels of 
agreement with dissonance reduction items when the client was low in reactance 
than when the client was high in reactance. This was particularly the case with the 
first, third and fourth dissonance reduction items (Appendix C, items 31, 33, and 
34)~each of which was found to be significant in univariate analyses. Compared to 
groups with highly reactant clients, respondents in groups with the client low in 
reactance more strongly endorsed these items: 1) I am concerned that the clinical 
utility of paradoxical interventions has not been sufficiently demonstrated; 2) I am 
not personally responsible for any manipulation that Chris may perceive; and 3) 
The outcome of the symptom prescription is attributable to Chris's compliance, not 
to my own lack of skill. In general, however, there was a limited effect of the 
manipulated variables on the dissonance reduction items. 
The influence of the reactance manipulation on dissonance reduction scores 
can be further examined by calculating the centroids for the high and low reactance 
groups. The centroid is a new variable created in the MANOVA procedure and can 
be calculated by summing the products of mean scores on dissonance reduction 
items by their respective discriminant weights. A discrepancy between centroid 
values indicates the nature of the differences between two groups as defined by a 
particular dependent measure (in this case, dissonance reduction). Respondents in 
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Table 15. Multiple analysis of variance for dissonance reduction scores 
Univariate Multivariate 
discriminant canonical effect 
Effects F eta^ weights weights F size 
Rationale 0.54 .02 
Reduce 1 .82 .00 -0.37 -0.55 
Reduce 2 2.05 .01 .49 .86 
Reduce 3 .02 .00 .00 .09 
Reduce 4 .00 .00 -0.08 -0.02 
Reduce 5 .15 .00 .07 -0.23 
Reactance 3.29* .08 
Reduce 1 5.9y .03 -0.42 -0.60 
Reduce 2 .25 .00 -0.08 -0.12 
Reduce 3 4.67* .02 -0.32 -0.53 
Reduce 4 6.78" .04 -0.45 -0.64 
Reduce 5 1.92 .01 -0.15 -0.34 
Rationale X Reactance 1.21 .03 
Reduce 1 2.17 .01 -0.31 -0.59 
Reduce 2 .09 .00 -0.15 -0.12 
Reduce 3 2.61 .01 .68 .65 
Reduce 4 .08 .00 -0.37 -0.12 
Reduce 5 1.23 .00 -0.21 -0.45 
Note: For all univariate tests, df = (1,186); for all multivariate tests, df = (5,182). 
•Denotes e<0.05. 
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groups with clients low in reactance (M=-4.35) reported stronger agreement with 
dissonance reduction Items than did respondents In conditions with clients high in 
reactance (M=-3.74). 
The lack of a strong pattern of significant relationships among dependent 
measures by condition suggested that a modeling procedure utilizing path analytic 
methods was not warranted. The existing set of findings was further interpreted by 
including the most relevant and significant variables in a post-hoc analysis, again 
utilizing multiple regression procedures. This procedure does not have the 
explanatory power to test the strength of all relationships among the manipulated 
and measured variables in the study. However, it Is possible to examine basic 
questions of Interest in this study, including testing for the potential of a mediational 
model whereby manipulations of rationale and reactance best explain treatment 
acceptability ratings through an affective state of cognitive dissonance. 
Post-hoc Analyses 
An additional hierarchical regression procedure was conducted to further 
examine the relationships among the variables in this study. The variables Included 
were the two manipulated variables rationale and reactance, the constructed 
variable of treatment experience, and the primary dependent variables of 
dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability. 
First, the scores of dissonance arousal were regressed on four blocks of 
variables, entered In a hierarchical manner; 1) treatment acceptability (serving as a 
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covariate to control for the relationship between dissonance arousal and treatment 
acceptability); 2) treatment conditions; 3) experience; and 4) the two-way interaction 
terms. Then, treatment acceptability scores were regressed in an identical 
procedure, but with dissonance arousal replacing treatment acceptability as the first 
entry (again, serving as a covariate) in the hierarchical procedure. 
This procedure was used to determine the amount of variance in the primary 
dependent measures (dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability) that can be 
uniquely explained by treatment conditions and respondent experience. The 
presence of significant r2 values from steps 2-4 in the analyses would suggest 
unique effects of the treatment conditions, experience, or the interactions of these 
on the dependent measures. To the extent that no such significant values were 
found using this procedure, the possibility existed that some higher order construct 
better accounts for scores on dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability. The 
results of these procedures are summarized in Tables 16 and 17. The values 
from this post-hoc procedure are depicted in Figure 13. 
Dissonance Arousal 
Results (see Table 16) showed an expected strong effect for treatment 
acceptability scores, which indicated that higher levels of dissonance arousal were 
associated with lower scores of treatment acceptability. The effects of individual 
treatment conditions were found to be nonsignificant. Higher levels of experience 
were associated with lower levels of dissonance arousal. 
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Table 16. Summary of post-hoc hierarchical regression analysis for variables 
predicting dissonance arousal scores 
Variable B SEB Beta t R^ctiange® 
Step 1 
Treat. Acceptability -0.65 .04 -0.75 -15.76" 
.55 
Step 2 
Rationale 
Reactance 
-0.52 
.78 
.43 
.43 • 
1 
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 p
 
b
 b
 
(O
 o
 
.1.21 
1.83 
.01 
Step 3 
Experience -2.35 .42 -0.26 -5.56* 
.06 
Step 4 
Rat X Exp 
React X Exp 
Rat X React 
.68 
.44 
.42 
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1.61 
1.06 
1.04 
.01 
•Denotes fi<.05. 
Table 17. Summary of post-hoc hierarchical regression analysis for variables 
predicting treatment acceptability scores 
Variable B SEB Beta t R^change^ 
step 1 
Treat. Acceptability -0.85 .05 -0.75 -15.76" 
.55 
Step 2 
Rationale 
Reactance 
-0.21 
.52 
.49 
.49 
-.52 
.05 
-0.43 
1.05 
.00 
Step 3 
Experience -0.42 .56 -0.04 -0.75 
.00 
Step 4 
Rat X Exp 
React X Exp 
Rat X React 
-0.17 
1.16 
-0.12 
.53 
.51 
.50 
-0.02 
.11 
-0.01 
-0.33 
1.27 
-0.24 
.01 
Denotes 2<.05. 
120 
Experience .00 Treatment Acceptability 
.01 
Conditions 
i k 
.55 
Interaction Terms 
(Experience X 
Conditions) 
Dissonance Arousal 
Figure 13. Diagram of values from post-hoc multiple regression procedures 
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Treatment Acceptability 
Results (see Table 17) showed an expected strong effect for dissonance 
arousal scores, which indicated that higher levels of treatment acceptability were 
associated with lower scores of dissonance. The effects of Individual treatment 
conditions, level of experience with paradoxical interventions, and Interaction terms 
were each found to be nonsignificant. 
Thus, individual conditions did not have significant effects on respondents' 
scores on either dissonance arousal or treatment acceptability. Level of experience 
with paradoxical interventions appears to be a relevant variable in accounting for 
respondents' ratings of paradoxical interventions, in that higher levels of experience 
were associated with lower levels of dissonance arousal. In the post-hoc analyses, 
the interactions between experience level and condition were found to be not 
significant. 
Finally, simple effects tests were conducted to examine the influence of 
experience on the primary dependent variables (dissonance arousal and treatment 
acceptability) within each condition. These results are presented in Tables 18 and 
19. Once again, dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability were each entered 
as the first block in a multiple regression procedure for the other in an attempt to 
control for the strong relationship between these two variables. Then, new 
variables were constructed that represented respondents' scores on experience for 
each of the four treatment conditions. These four newly constructed variables were 
then entered as the second block in the regression procedure. 
122 
The results Indicated that the simple effects of experience within each of the 
conditions were statistically significant predictors of dissonance arousal scores, but 
were not statistically significant predictors of treatment acceptability scores. These 
results provide support for the hypothesis that dissonance arousal played a 
mediatlonal role In the relationship between the primary predictors (treatment 
conditions and experience with paradoxical treatments) and treatment acceptability 
of paradoxical Interventions In this study. 
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Table 18. Summaty of post-hoc hierarchical regression analysis for variables 
predicting dissonance arousal scores (simple effects testing) 
B SEB Beta t  change^ Variable 
Step 1 
Treat. Acceptability -0.58 
Step 2 
Exp (Cond 1) -0.41 
Exp (Cond 2) -0.40 
Exp (Cond 3) -0.48 
Exp (Cond 4) -0.42 
.55 
.04 -0.66 -14.21* 
.07 
.09 -0.43 -4.73 
.09 -0.38 -4.51' 
.08 -0.55 -5.92' 
.08 -0.46 -5.12' 
•Denotes fi<.05. 
Table 19. Summary of post-hoc hierarchical regression analysis for variables 
predicting treatment acceptability scores (simple effects testing) 
B SE B Beta t change^ 
.55 
Variable 
Step 1 
Dissonance Arousal -0.88 
Step 2 
Exp (Cond 1) -0.05 
Exp (Cond 2) -0.03 
Exp (Cond 3) -0.11 
Exp (Cond 4) -0.10 
.06 -0.77 -14.21* 
.11 -0.05 -0.44 
.11 -0.02 -0.24 
.11 -0.11 -1.05 
.11 -0.10 -0.90 
•Denotes b<.05. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This study proposed a model to explain the effects that the therapeutic 
rationale, the level of psychological reactance potential and the level of experience 
with paradoxical interventions have on licensed psychologists' ratings of treatment 
acceptability of paradoxical interventions. This model was hypothesized to include 
cognitive dissonance arousal as a mediating variable, and dissonance reduction 
strategies to be endorsed when arousal levels became significant. Specific 
predictions were made regarding main effects and interactions, as well as the 
content and interrelationships of variables in a proposed overall model. 
A sample of experienced, licensed psychologists reported generally 
favorable ratings of paradoxical interventions. The clinical case vignette used in the 
study was found to be credible, and with only one exception, the multi-item scales 
developed for use in this study appeared to have adequate psychometric properties 
for inclusion in this study. Psychologists' ratings of treatment acceptability for a 
variety of interventions were consistent with previous research in noting that 
paradoxical interventions were rated generally lower in acceptability than were other 
interventions (Hunsely, 1993; Betts & Remer, 1993; Cavell et al., 1986). Consistent 
with Dowd's (1995; 1986) conceptualization, respondents reported that the likely 
mechanisms of change for paradoxical interventions included a novel reframe as 
well as the use of a therapeutic double-bind. 
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Primary analyses revealed several significant predicted interactions, 
although predicted main effects for manipulated variables were not significant. It 
was found that the overall hypothesized model did fit the pattern of results, 
indicating that dissonance arousal did play a mediational role between primary 
predictor variables (rationale, reactance and experience) and treatment 
acceptability scores. 
This chapter is organized into two sections, and begins with a summary of 
the results of this study, including a review of significant findings and potential 
reasons for nonsignificant findings that were hypothesized. This chapter concludes 
with a critique of the study, including a description of the strengths, unique aspects, 
and limitations of the study. Finally, suggestions for future research are offered. 
Summary 
Respondents 
Respondents reported a broad range of clinical experience, the vast majority 
practicing at the doctoral level (primarily Ph.D.). Nearly half of the respondents 
reported primary practice settings in private or group practice. Although the nature 
of respondents' clientele, type of treatment and theoretical orientation was diverse, 
many indicated that the majority of their time was spent working with adults in 
individual treatment, with a preference toward eclectic/integrative, cognitive, and 
behavioral treatment approaches. In a general sense, cognitive and behavioral 
treatments were perceived to be more acceptable than symptom prescription. One 
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set of items asked respondents to indicate their belief about the mechanism of 
change in paradoxical interventions. Results showed that the sample of 
psychologists mean ratings were consistent with Dowd's (1995; 1986) 
aforementioned opinion that providing a novel reframe and a therapeutic double-
bind are the most likely means by which paradoxical interventions affect client 
change. 
In terms of experience with paradoxical interventions, the majority of 
respondents indicated that they had used paradoxical interventions, had received 
training and supervision in using paradoxical interventions, and believed that using 
such treatment approaches requires extensive training and supervision. Most 
disagreed that paradoxical interventions conflict with principles of informed consent, 
and reported that these interventions were ethically sound and can be effective in 
leading to client change. In general, this sample of licensed psychologists reported 
favorable ratings for this class of Interventions, although a minority of respondents 
provided ratings indicating very limited experience using these interventions and 
strong negative ratings in terms of overall acceptability. 
Response Rate 
A response rate of 38.2% is certainly less than would have been desired for 
a project of this size, and indicated some limit to the external validity of the results. 
Weathers, Furlong and Solorzano (1993) reported that 43.5% of studies selected 
over a nine year period in The Journal of Counseling Psvcholoav reported response 
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rates of less than 50%; just under 10% of those studies reported response rates of 
less than 40%. It was encouraging that response rates did not differ significantly by 
state or condition, nor did the gender ratios of respondents differ significantly from 
expected values. 
Effectiveness of Manipulations and Instrument Development 
The experimental manipulation of whether or not a rationale was to be given 
for the paradoxical intervention was generally effective, though more strongly for the 
rationale absent than for the rationale present condition. It is possible that the 
presence of a rationale is defined differentially by clinicians, contingent upon their 
own theoretical orientations, experiences, and particular case characteristics. It is 
noteworthy that some studies (Boettcher & Dowd, 1988) have provided several 
different levels of treatment rationale in an experimental study. 
The other experimental manipulation (reactance level of the proposed client) 
was less successful. The effect for low reactance conditions was quite good, 
whereas the effect for high reactance conditions (though significantly different from 
low reactance conditions on the manipulation check item) was perceived rather 
ambiguously. Review of this manipulation suggests possible reasons that may 
account for this lack of strong effect. 
First, the representation of a highly reactant client may have failed to portray 
a person who truly behaves in ways that are characterized as resisting interpersonal 
influence. It is possible that the highly reactant client was instead perceived to be 
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passively lacking in commitment to treatment, rather than oppositional and actively 
resistant. Secondly, the manipulation check item may have been an inadequate 
test to discriminate perceptions of this personality variable. A third possibility is the 
notion that it may be quite difficult to present high levels of psychological reactance 
in a brief vignette. The level of clarity and emotional impact that occurs when one is 
engaged in an interpersonal exchange with such a client, with the intent to establish 
trust and provide some level of professional influence, would certainly be expected 
to be a qualitatively different experience than can be obtained by reading a vignette. 
Across conditions, the vignette was perceived to have good clinical 
credibility. There was some tendency for respondents to be better able to relate to 
the role of psychologist when the client in the vignette was low in reactance. This 
may be associated with the ambiguously perceived high reactance conditions, 
although the base rate of levels of psychological reactance in the general 
population may offer some additional insight into this result. If high levels of 
reactance are generally less commonly presented in clinical settings or in the 
general population, one would expect low ratings of perceived similarity between 
vignettes with highly reactant clients and everyday clinical practice. 
In terms of the respondents' abilities to imagine themselves in the 
psychologist role, the results were consistent with previously defined compliance-
end defiance-based theoretical notions about the use of paradoxical interventions 
(Rohrbaugh, Tennen, Press & White, 1981). Specifically, a significant interaction 
indicated that in conditions with no rationale, respondents were better able to 
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imagine themselves in the role with the client was high in reactance than with the 
client low in reactance (consistent with a defiance-based strategy). The opposite 
effect emerged in conditions with the rationale present. In these conditions, 
respondents were better able to imagine themselves in the role with the client low in 
reactance than with the client high in reactance (consistent with a compliance-
based strategy). 
Three multi-item scales (dissonance arousal, treatment acceptability, and 
dissonance reduction) were constructed to measure the effects of these 
experimental manipulations, and a fourth was constructed to measure level of 
experience with paradoxical interventions. With the exception of the dissonance 
reduction scale, these measures were found to have adequate psychometric 
properties to warrant their inclusion as variables in subsequent analysis. As 
predicted, a strong negative correlation was found between dissonance arousal and 
treatment acceptability. 
This relationship was strong enough to warrant an examination of the 
discriminant validity of these two variables. The very high internal consistencies of 
both scales, the results of confirmatory factor analyses, and an examination of item 
and scale statistics appeared to establish adequate discriminant validity to justify 
the inclusion of these measures as distinct variables within the primary analyses. In 
addition to results which suggest a significant amount of unique variance prior to 
performing the primary analyses, the subsequent regression analyses revealed 
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somewhat different patterns of associations when scores on these scales were 
regressed on the set of predictor variables. 
Results of Primary Analyses and Test of the Model 
A number of demographic variables were hypothesized to have some 
predictive value in relation to the primary criterion variables. Statistical significance 
was the criterion for determining if a variable or set of variables was to be included 
as the first step in a hierarchical regression procedure. However, the results 
showed that none of these variables made a significant contribution to the proposed 
model. This result led to the decision to exclude all demographic variables from 
subsequent analyses. 
Examination of these demographic variables provides some suggestions to 
explain this lack of significant findings. First, some of these hypothesized predictors 
may have lost some of their predictive power due to the need to convert the scale of 
measurement to a format suitable for meaningful analysis. For example, theoretical 
orientation items were written In such a way to obtain a level of emphasis on a 
variety of orientations for each individual respondent. Although this provides some 
interesting descriptive data that may capture more external validity for clinicians 
with multidimensional perspectives, these continuous, non-independent measures 
were not suitable for Inclusion In these analyses. A conversion was conducted to 
establish independence of ratings (e.g., the "primary adherent" results reported 
earlier) and to categorize this variable. However, this process resulted in excluding 
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a significant number of respondents who may have otherwise been useful in 
enhancing the predictive power of the analyses. Also, the use of many single item 
measures with limited variance may have also d the ability to adequately test the 
demographic hypotheses. The inclusion of demographic predictors based on 
measures that have well-established psychometric properties is recommended for 
future studies. 
Analyses were done separately for the dissonance reduction items, which 
lacked adequate Internal consistency to be included as a multi-item measure, and 
so were subjected to a procedure targeted to evaluate the effects of the 
manipulated variables on each of the items individually as well as in a multivariate 
analysis. As was previously mentioned, due to very low internal consistency, the 
dissonance reduction Items were subjected to their own analytic procedure 
(MANOVA) to evaluate the impact of manipulated variables on these dependent 
measures. The only significant multivariate effect that emerged indicated that 
respondents in conditions with clients low in reactance indicated more agreement 
with dissonance reducing strategies than did respondents in conditions with clients 
high in reactance. This is somewhat difficult to interpret, given the lack of a 
reactance main effect and two-way interactions on arousal scores. It might be that 
these dissonance reduction items do not in fact represent constructs that reduce a 
negative affective state, but instead some other construct associated with the 
reactance potential of the client. The limited impact of predicted variables on 
dissonance reduction strategies may simply be a product of the limited overall levels 
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of dissonance arousal on the part of respondents. That is, the reduction of negative 
affect presupposes the initial presence of such affect. 
As predicted, a main effect on dissonance arousal and treatment 
acceptability scores for the variable measuring experience with paradoxical 
interventions was significant. This relationship indicated that as a clinician's level of 
experience with paradoxical interventions is greater, their ratings of dissonance 
arousal were lower and their ratings of treatment acceptability were higher. This 
result is certainly not surprising, but the inclusion of this variable was important to 
the extent experience was predicted have a moderating effect on the influence of 
the predictor variables. 
For both dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability, no main effects 
were found for either of the experimental manipulations of rationale and reactance. 
Earlier, the discussion of the only partially effective manipulation of high levels of 
reactance was noteworthy in the implications that result would have on predictions 
about manipulated effects on the primary dependent measures. An ambiguously 
perceived vignette intended to portray high levels of reactance would be expected 
to diminish the power of that manipulation, whether measuring an affective state of 
discomfort or the acceptability of the treatment. The absence of a main effect for 
rationale is not well understood by merely examining the effectiveness of the 
experimental manipulation-a manipulation that appeared to have been successful. 
The effect of the rationale manipulation seems to have occurred within the 
context of an interaction with the measure of psychologists' levels of experience 
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with paradoxical interventions. The pattern of the interactions were found to be as 
predicted for both dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability, although the 
amount of variance these interactions explain in the dependent measures is in fact 
minimal. 
The nature of these interactions suggested that, when compared to 
respondents with less experience, respondents when more experience reported 
lower levels of dissonance arousal in conditions with the rationale was absent than 
when the rationale was present. In addition, when compared to respondents with 
more experience, respondents with less experience reported lower levels of 
dissonance arousal in conditions when the rationale was present than when the 
rationale was absent. 
With regard to treatment acceptability, when compared to respondents with 
less experience, respondents with more experience reported higher levels of 
treatment acceptability in conditions when the rationale was absent than when the 
rationale was present. Also, when compared to respondents with more experience, 
respondents with less experience reported higher levels of treatment acceptability in 
conditions when the rationale was present than when the rationale was absent. 
The hypothesized prediction of a reactance X experience interaction was 
found for treatment acceptability scores, but not for dissonance arousal. The 
interaction for treatment acceptability indicated that, when compared to respondents 
with less experience, respondents with more experience reported higher levels of 
treatment acceptability in conditions when the client was high in reactance than in 
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conditions when the client was low in reactance. Also, when compared to 
respondents with more experience, respondents with less experience reported 
higher levels of treatment acceptability in conditions when the client was low in 
reactance than in conditions when the client was high in reactance. 
This reactance X experience interaction was consistent with predictions, but 
accounted for a very limited amount of the variance in treatment acceptability 
scores. The statistic for the dissonance arousal interaction did not approach 
significance. The absence of the reactance X experience interaction for dissonance 
arousal scores was not expected, and is especially interesting in that the predicted 
interaction was significant for treatment acceptability. 
Consider the hypothesis that, in general, the experience levels of clinicians 
has a bearing on the relative importance of the manipulated variables. Perhaps, 
within this context, varying levels of psychological reactance in patients was seen 
as relevant in determining the appropriateness of a treatment (producing a 
significant interaction with treatment acceptability), but not so important as to elicit 
affective discomfort in the form of cognitive dissonance (the absence of a 
dissonance arousal interaction). On the other hand, it may be that the presence or 
absence of a therapeutic rationale is an even more salient consideration than is the 
reactance potential of the client, particularly when considering the experience level 
of the clinician. Under such circumstances, the manipulation of the rationale 
construct may be significant enough to influence acceptability ratings as well as to 
elicit changes in cognitive dissonance-accounting for the rationale X experience 
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interactions which were significant for both dissonance arousal and treatment 
acceptability. 
One might also consider the notion that level of reactance potential is a 
construct obviously within the domain of the client's part of the therapy interaction. 
Meanwhile, the choice to withhold or disclose a rationale for treatment is within the 
domain of the psychologist. Perhaps the reason that dissonance arousal was 
predicted by an interaction involving the rationale manipulation and not reactance is 
due to some form of perceived responsibility over the rationale, whereas the 
relevance of reactance could be dismissed as an affective issue on the basis of 
reactance being a personality variable external to the psychologist and the 
responsibility of the client. Once again, it is worth noting that the ambiguously 
perceived manipulation of high levels of reactance may not have allowed for an 
adequate test of some of the hypotheses that involved that variable. 
An unexpected three-way interaction for rationale X reactance X experience 
was found for dissonance arousal scores. The same general effect of higher levels 
of experience being associated with lower levels of dissonance arousal was evident 
in the conditions with clients designated as high in reactance. However, with clients 
low in reactance, the presence or absence of a rationale seemed to have a 
differential effect on the general relationship between experience and arousal. For 
clients low in reactance, higher levels of experience was very minimally associated 
with lower levels of arousal when the rationale was present. However, when the 
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rationale was absent, higher levels of experience were very strongly associated with 
s in dissonance arousal. 
Taken together, this pattern of main effects and interactions seems to 
suggest that the level of the psychologists experience with paradoxical interventions 
is an important variable in the process of evaluating treatment acceptability. With 
regard to predicting the importance that client reactance potential and the role of the 
rationale have on making such judgments, clinicians with varying levels of 
experience may come to divergent conclusions. 
A post-hoc set of regression analyses was conducted to include those 
variables that did play a part in some predicted findings. The purpose of this 
procedure was to simply determine what (if any) effect the manipulated variables 
had on the primary dependent measures. A central distinguishing feature of this 
analysis was the inclusion of treatment acceptability and dissonance arousal as 
initial variables for entry into the other's respective regression analysis. This was 
conducted in an attempt to control for the strong relationship between the two 
variables. 
This procedure demonstrated the expected strong relationship between 
dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability. The effect of treatments on either 
dissonance arousal or treatment acceptability were nonsignificant. The role of 
experience with paradoxical interventions was determined via the aforementioned 
post-hoc analysis, as well as via simple effects testing to examine the role of 
experience in predicting dependent measures within each condition. Experience 
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was a significant predictor of dissonance arousal scores, but not of treatment 
acceptability scores. The overall pattern of these results indicated that a model that 
places dissonance in a role which mediates that effect of rationale and reactance on 
treatment acceptability ratings did fit the data. 
Critique 
This study proposed to offer insight into the process by which psychologists 
make decisions about the appropriateness of paradoxical interventions. The 
experimental nature of the study utilizing clinical vignettes provided a high level of 
internal validity that was beneficial in testing fairly specific hypotheses, but as is 
well understood in the literature, limits the external validity of the study. 
The central premise of the study was to examine the role of cognitive 
dissonance in the rating of treatment acceptability of paradoxical interventions. As 
previously noted in this document, most studies of dissonance arousal involve 
attitude change secondary to the experience of arousal. This study was designed 
to measure the level of arousal, but not attitude change. However, it may be 
possible to consider the experience with paradoxical interventions variable as a pre-
treatment measure of treatment acceptability, given the attitudinal nature of three of 
five of the items. This would allow for comparisons with treatment acceptability 
scores. 
The results indicated that dissonance did mediate the relationship between 
primary predictor variables (rationale, reactance, and experience) and treatment 
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acceptability. This occurred despite the fact that the data demonstrated that 
dissonance arousal and treatment acceptability (as defined and measured in this 
study) were highly related constructs. 
The current study surveyed licensed psychologists to assess their evaluation 
of treatment acceptability of symptom prescription, manipulating the presence or 
absence of a rationale and the degree of client psychological reactance. The 
conditions of the study were fully crossed (a problem in Hunsley & LeFebvre, 1991), 
and a number of respondents adequate for the proposed statistical analyses was 
targeted (Hunsley, 1993, reported that inadequate power may have compromised 
conclusions of his study). Measures were taken to enhance response rate 
(Weathers, Furlong, & Soloranzo, 1993). The measurement of theoretical 
orientation was more sophisticated than Hunsley and LeFebvre's (1991) distinction 
between "strategic/systemic" and "other," and reflected the current literature on 
measuring this important dimension of professional practice (Poznanski & 
McLennan, 1995). Compared to previous studies, a more detailed, behavioral 
description of psychological reactance potential (which includes current personality 
assessment research) was used in the vignette (Dowd et al., 1994). 
This study offers new information in the form of a quantitative assessment of 
licensed psychologists' levels of experience with paradoxical interventions. Most 
respondents in this study reported that they indeed had used paradoxical 
interventions, that they had training and supervision in the use of such 
interventions, and that such training and supervision is an Important condition for 
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the practice of utilizing paradoxical interventions. Most respondents believed that 
such interventions are ethically sound and can be effective strategies to facilitate 
client change. Although the presence of critical writings regarding the nature and 
use of paradoxical treatment strategies has been in the literature of the last two 
decades, these results suggest that a majority of clinicians do not endorse such 
criticisms. 
Considering the previous statement within the context of the findings of this 
study (particularly the significant two-way interactions), one might also suggest that 
level of experience with paradoxical intervention can be a relevant variable in 
making finer distinctions about treatment acceptability when previously researched 
variables (e.g., rationale, reactance) are considered. This addresses the second 
purpose of the study: to gain an understanding of clinicians' decisions concerning 
whether to use paradoxical interventions. When compared to clinicians with less 
experience using these interventions, clinicians with more experience may be more 
likely to consider the reactance potential of clients and the potential impact of 
whether to include a therapeutic rationale. Clinicians with more experience seemed 
to be more accepting of using paradoxical interventions with clients higher in 
reactance, and more accepting of not disclosing the rationale. 
Future researchers might enhance the efforts begun in this project by 
designing process research to better understand the specific decision rules about 
treatment acceptability that therapists employ when considering treatment options. 
The specificity of the interactions of experience with manipulated variables in this 
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study suggest that such decisions may well be very specific to a clinician's 
familiarity with a particular intervention. Conducting such studies in the context of 
actual treatment would certainly be of benefit to enhance the generalizability of this 
line of research. 
Also, future studies in this area would clearly benefit from selecting well-
defined, potentially robust predictor variables measured with scales of established 
psychometric soundness. For example, multi-item measures of theoretical 
orientation may capture some of the differences that distinguish persons who 
endorse paradoxical interventions under certain conditions more than others. 
Qualitative research to elicit responses from clinicians regarding their own 
criteria for acceptable usage of paradoxical interventions would also be a 
recommended approach to identify salient variables to include in future studies. It 
would also be interesting to identify the extent to which clinicians truly experience 
some form of cognitive dissonance in the therapy process, when confronted with the 
choice to work paradoxically. If future studies were to use dissonance arousal as a 
potential mediator, assessment of clinician behaviors as rated by obsea'ers as a 
dependent measure rather than self-reports of attitudes should also be considered. 
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August 1,1996 
Dear Colleague: 
We are requesting your participation in a study of psychologists' practices in the use of paradoxical 
interventions. You have been selected to receive this survey because you are in a unique position to 
help provide a better understanding of current professional attitudes and practices in this area of 
psychology. Your perspectives and responses are essential to this study and are highly valued. 
Research studies have indicated that the use of paradoxical interventions has been associated with 
controversy among practicing psychologists who must strive to both meet the needs of their clients 
with effective therapeutic interventions while maintaining the highest ethical standards of practice. 
The controversy associated with treatment acceptability of paradoxical interventions substantiates 
the need for an accurate assessment of attitudes and practices within the profession. 
This research project has been reviewed and approved by the University Committee on Participants 
in Research and meets applicable ethical standards and guidelines. Your completion and return of 
the anonymous survey will constitute modified informed consent for participation in this project. 
Completion of this anonymous survey will likely take approximately 15 minutes. Your responses will 
be kept confidential. We request that you not put your name or any other identifying information 
anywhere on this survey. 
The response card in this packet (to be retumed separately) is coded with a number that does not 
appear on the survey or the return envelope. The coded response cards are used only so we can 
send surveys to individuals who did not respond to the first mailing. At no time will completed 
surveys be associated with the code number or any other identifying information. 
After completing the survey, please mail it in the enclosed postage paid envelope. In addition, 
please retum the attached postage paid response card separately so that your anonymity will be 
assured. We would appreciate a response by May 15. 
We greatly appreciate your cooperation, and value your responses. 
Sincerely, 
Michael C. March, M.S. 
Principal Investigator 
Norman A. Scott, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
Camilla P. Benbow, Ed.D. 
Professor and Chair 
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September 12,1996 
Dear Colleague; 
We are making a second request for your participation in a study of psychologists' practices in the 
use of paradoxical interventions. You have been selected to receive this survey because you are in 
a unique position to help provide a better understanding of current professional attitudes and 
practices in this area of psychology. Your perspectives and responses are essential to this study. 
Hence, we are following up on the request made to you during August, 1996 with a second, identical 
survey packet, as we need and value your responses. 
This research project has been reviewed and approved by the University Committee on Participants 
in Research and meets applicable ethical standards and guidelines. Your completion and return of 
the anonymous survey will constitute modified informed consent for participation in this project. 
Completion of this anonymous survey will likely take approximately 15 minutes. We realize that as a 
professional psychologist you already have many demands on your time. We hope that you will find 
time to assist us in this study, as your knowledge and experience are critical in understanding this 
area of professional practice. 
Your responses will be kept confidential. We request that you not put your name or any other 
identifying information anywhere on this survey. At no time will completed surveys t}e associated 
with any identifying information. After completing the survey, please mail it in the enclosed postage 
paid envelope. If you have already completed and retumed the prior survey, thank you. 
We greatly appreciate your involvement, and look forward to your responses. 
Sincerely, 
Michael C. March, M.S. 
Doctoral Candidate 
Norman A. Scott, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
Camilla P. Benbow, Ed.D. 
Professor and Chair 
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SURVEY OF LICENSED PSYCHOLOGISTS 
Please return the completed survey in the enclosed postage-paid envelope. In order to maintain the 
anonymity of your responses, please do not write your name or any other identifying information on the 
survey or the envelope. Your responses will remain anonymous and confidential. Due to the need to use 
research resources effidently, clinical information in the case description is necessarily brief. 
Thank you for your investment in this study. 
Wis would value your perspectives on the following statements (please use tite scale below): 
1 2  3  4  5  6  
strongly moderately slightly slightly moderately strongly 
disagree disagree disagree agree agree agree 
1. I have used paradoxical interventions in my practice. 
2. I have received training and supervision in the therapeutic use of paradoxical interventions. 
3. Paradoxical interventions conflict with prindples of informed consent. 
4. Paradoxical interventions can be effective treatment strategies. 
5. The use of paradoxical interventions requires extensive training and supervision. 
6. Paradoxical interventions are ethically sound treatment strategies. 
Please read the following case vignette: 
Imagine that you are employed by a mental health agency as a licensed staff psychologist. You 
provide outpatient psychotherapy and psychological assessment in addition to performing 
supervisory and administrative responsibilities. Your client Chris has been in therapy with you for a 
total of five sessions, and you would describe your relationship as "excellent." Treatment has been 
focused on reducing Chris's symptoms of anxiety associated with a major adjustment in job 
responsibilities; primary symptoms are excessive rumination and worrying, irritability, fear of losing 
control, and restlessness. You are scheduled to present your work with Chris at the next agency 
case conference. 
Chris expressed a high degree of interest in therapy, but has shown less behavioral commitment. 
Chris has arrived late to several sessions and has failed to complete mutually agreed-upon 
assigned readings and joumaling tasks. Chris's behaviors within session are characterized with 
some reluctance in tenms of taking risks. Personality assessment results suggested low concern 
for making a good impression, low concern for following social norms, low tolerance of other's 
beliefs and values, and an inclination to express strong feelings and emotions. 
At this point, it is the end of your fifth session with Chris. You have decided to administer a 
paradoxical intervention known as symptom prescription. Specifically, you formulate (with Chris's 
assistance) the task of scheduling nightly homework sessions, one hour in duration, when Chris is 
to sit down in front of work brought home from the place of employment Meanwhile, Chris is 
assigned to engage in and exacerbate previously described symptoms of anxiety. For example, 
behaviors should present restlessness and fidgeting, and avoidance of completing work-related 
tasks. Additionally, Chris has been instructed to ruminate extensively on the overwhelming nature 
of the new job, and to focus on previously described fears regarding the perceived inability to 
manage responsibilities. 
In the process of assigning this intervention, you provide specific explanations of how you expect 
the paradoxical intervention to lead to the desired behavior change. 
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Please use the scale below for all of the Items on this page: 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
strongly moderately slightly slightly moderately strongly 
disagree disagree disagree agree agree agree 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements about the vignette: 
7. Chris appears to be resisting my interpersonal influence as a therapist. 
8. Chris was given the rationale for this intervention. 
9. Chris's problem and behaviors are generally similar to those presented by clients in my clinical 
practice. 
10 . I am comfortable working with Chris. 
11 . I am able to imagine myself in this psychologist role. 
12 . This is an acceptable choice of intervention for this case. 
13 . The treatment should be effective in changing Chris's symptoms. 
14 . Chris's symptoms are severe enough to justify the use of this intervention. 
15 . I would be willing to use this treatment with one of my own clients. 
16 . This intervention is likely to have bad side effects for Chris. 
17 . I expect positive results from this particular intervention. 
18 . Overall, this fonn of treatment will be helpful. 
19 . I am confident that a paradoxical intervention would be appropriate with Chris. 
20 . Given a successful outcome, I would consider using symptom prescription again in the future. 
21 . The potential benerrts of using a paradoxical intervention outweigh the potential risks. 
22 . I provide only those treatments that have been empirically validated. 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements about the vignette: 
23 . I regret taking the risk of providing this intervention. 
24 . I feel guilty about prescribing Chris's symptoms. 
25 . I have deceived Chris with my choice of intervention. 
26 . I feel tension after prescribing a paradoxical intervention with Chris. 
27 . I am uncomfortable about the potential damage that may be done to my relationship with Chris. 
28 . I have been unjustifiably manipulative toward Chris. 
29 . I have no apprehension about administering a paradoxical intervention with Chris. 
30 . I will be comfortable sharing this intervention choice with my colleagues. 
31 . I am concemed that the clinical utility of paradoxical interventions has not been suffidently 
demonstrated. 
32 . The influence of managed care in psychotherapy encourages the use of provocative interventions. 
33 . I am not personally responsible for any manipulation that Chris may perceive. 
34 . The outcome of the symptom prescription Is attributable to Chris's compliance, not to my own lack 
of skill. 
35 . My ethical concerns about paradoxical interventions make this a poor choice for this client. 
Please rate the extent to which you agree that the following interventions would be appropriate for 
Chris: 
36 . Analysis of transference and countertransference 
37 . Assertiveness training 
38 . Relaxation training 
39 . Symptom prescription 
40 . Challenge cognitive distortions and irrational thinking 
Please rate the extent to which you believe each option represents how paradoxical interventions 
produce client change: 
41 . Pladng the client in a therapeutic double bind 
42 . Capitalizing on a client's tendency to resist the Influence of the therapist 
43 . Creating such a therapeutic ordeal that the dient begins to avoid symptomatic behaviors 
44 . Providing the dient with a novel frame of reference for the problem and its solution 
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Please use the scale below to respond to the next two sets of Items: 
1  2  3  4  5  
no slight moderate strong very strong 
emphasis emphasis emphasis emphasis emphasis 
In your clinical practice. Indicate your emphasis on each of the following theoretical orientations: 
45 . Cognitive/rational 
46 . Behavioral 
47 . Psychodynamic 
48 . Existential 
49 . Systemic 
50 . Eclectic/integrative 
In your clinical practice, indicate your emphasis on each of the following factors: 
51 . Being directive as a therapist 
52 . Being active and spontaneous as a therapist 
53 . Maintaining personal distance from the client 
54 . Attending to the client's objective, observable behaviors 
55 . Attending to my subjective, intuitive elements of experience 
56 . Focusing on conscious processes 
57 . Focusing on unconscious processes 
Please respond to the following: 
58. What is your sex (please circle): M F 
59. Please write in your age: 
60. Please write in your number of years of post-doctoral clinical experience: 
61. Highest academic degree (please check): 
M.A./M.S. Ph.D. Ed.D. Psy.D. 
62. Indicate the primary setting in which you practice (please check one): 
Child facility Private general hospital 
Community mental health center Private psychiatric hospital 
Consortium State/county hospital 
Health Maintenance Organization University counseling center 
Medical School VA Medical Center 
Military Medical Center Other 
63. Indicate (by writing estimated percentages in columns that total 100%) the percentage of your clientele 
that are: 
Children Individual 
Adolescents Marital 
Adult Family 
Geriatric adult Group 
100% 100% 
149 
APPENDIX D 
RESPONSE CARD 
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Please return this response card separately 
from your completed survey. Thank you 
again for your investment in this study. 
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APPENDIX E 
MASTER TABLE OF MEANS BY CONDITION 
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Master Table of Means by Condition 
Variable Mean SD 
Experience 
Condition 1 20.19 6.25 
Condition 2 21.25 4.90 
Condition 3 22.74 4.73 
Condition 4 21.75 5.30 
Total 21.48 5.41 
Dissonance Arousal 
Condition 1 24.14 9.19 
Condition 2 22.73 9.37 
Condition 3 19.74 7.12 
Condition 4 23.32 10.12 
Total 22.49 9.09 
Treatment Acceptability 
Condition 1 33.12 9.48 
Condition 2 35.13 10.86 
Condition 3 36.05 9.55 
Condition 4 33.41 11.66 
Total 34.38 10.37 
Reduce 1 
Condition 1 3.65 1.48 
Condition 2 3.49 1.23 
Condition 3 2.89 1.53 
Condition 4 3.26 1.62 
Total 3.32 1.50 
Reduce 2 
Condition 1 3.65 1.70 
Condition 2 3.22 1.82 
Condition 3 3.50 1.70 
Condition 4 3.27 1.75 
Total 3.42 1.73 
Reduce 3 
Condition 1 2.29 1.29 
Condition 2 2.48 1.48 
Condition 3 2.19 1.05 
Condition 4 1.81 0.95 
Total 2.17 1.21 
Reduce 4 
Condition 1 2.91 1.32 
Condition 2 2.90 1.14 
Condition 3 2.43 1.19 
Condition 4 2.53 1.42 
Total 2.68 1.29 
Reduce 5 
Condition 1 3.13 1.54 
Condition 2 3.00 1.43 
Condition 3 2.70 1.28 
Condition 4 2.90 1.52 
Total 2.93 1.45 
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